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MARIANNE L. WADE*
TRUE EU CITIZENSHIP AS A PRECURSOR TO GENUINE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: AN ANALYSIS OF EU
CITIZENSHIP AS IT RELATES TO A SUSTAINABLE AREA
OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
ABSTRACT. This paper traces developments - both legal and political in nature -
relating toEUcitizenship and compares the status quo towhat individualsmight expect
from citizenship particularly within the context of criminal proceedings. Drawing upon
debates in political science, it highlights the divergence betweenEUcitizenship andwhat
would normally be associated with any idea of citizenship. Exploring the parameters of
European criminal justice and its revolutionary direction of travel, this essay highlights
how strongly exposed EU citizens are to enhanced coercive state power within criminal
proceedings because of this status. Consequently it advances an argument that rea-
sonable expectations of citizenship are set up to be disappointed in the current context.
This is particularly true as the CJEU scales back the protections associated with EU
citizenship in the face of political pressure. It argues that the loss of legitimacy the EU
may suffer as a result affects not only its relationship to citizens. As the European
institutions take action against democratically elected governments viewed as in breach
of fundamental EU values, its potential as a policy-laundering governance level in the
criminal justice arena is identified as an enormous legitimacy problem. Analysing
developments relevant to citizenship from a criminal justice perspective, this paper
demonstrates that reform is urgently required. Leaving EU citizenship in its current
form - shapedbyExecutive powers - is argued to expose theEU to legitimacy arguments
it cannot win, as well as individual citizens to injustice in criminal proceedings.
* Marianne L. Wade Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham,
Birmingham, UK. Email: m.l.wade@bham.ac.uk.
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I INTRODUCTION
Citizenship is a concept born of revolution. In the modern era, it is a
defining feature of modern liberal democracies and shapes central
expectations of those living within them, of a balance struck between
executive power and the liberty of individual citizens. These are
constellations perhaps not immediately associated with the European
Union, which is itself a forum of evolution: what began as a con-
glomeration of nation states bound only via economic ties now in-
cludes EU citizenship for all nationals of member states.
Furthermore, the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) and
its novel criminal justice mechanisms has become a central tenet of
EU work, with the creation of a common European Public Prose-
cutor’s Office (EPPO) for 22 member states forming the revolutionary
cutting edge of this policy area.1
Scholarly discussion of EU Citizenship is well-established and
multi-faceted. These debates, however, run along the lines of activity
that the EU is more traditionally associated with, as we shall see. The
uniform criticism of the AFSJ as unbalanced and frequently endan-
gering citizens’ liberties might suggest that EU citizenship must
somehow be dislocated or disconnected from the AFSJ. Since the
advent of the Treaty of Lisbon, however, it most decidedly is not (nor
should it be, as this paper highlights).
This paper emphasises that the density of criminal justice provi-
sion at the EU level (i.e. for EU citizens), both legislative and insti-
tutional, is now so significant that it is reasonable to speak of EU
citizens being exposed to certain criminal justice forms and mecha-
nisms by virtue of that citizenship. This undeniably impacts upon
core citizenship rights and matters. Via an exploration of the idea of
citizenship and an analysis of what EU citizenship has come to mean,
this article will demonstrate that the status quo is unsatisfactory,
precisely because EU citizenship was not established with the needs of
criminal justice in mind. Whilst acknowledging that EU citizenship
requires novel concepts, recognising the differences between this
supranational governance level and that of its member states, this
paper calls for EU citizenship to be reformed to align with more
conventional definitions. Given the significant value of criminal jus-
1 Note the key value associated with security co-operation in Brexit negotiations.
See Asthana et al., ‘‘Don’t blackmail us over security, EU warns May’’ (30 March
2017) The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/29/brexit-eu-
condemns-mays-blackmail-over-security-cooperation.
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tice mechanisms and institutions operating at the EU level, it is ar-
gued that EU citizenship must now urgently be adapted, to some-
thing more closely aligned with modern expectations and able to
perform its vital tasks. The failure to re-conceptualise EU criminal
justice measures at the heart of citizenship law has become unsus-
tainable.
The key point is that the application of the constitutional princi-
ples embodied in notions of citizenship (of both individual member
states and the EU itself)2 on former third-pillar matters (i.e. the
AFSJ) is insufficient. The constitutionalisation of the EU has oc-
curred in line with the freedoms it was providing, formed by an
executive-dominated legislature committed to the notion that the EU
should not wield power in terms of criminal justice. Whilst criminal
justice usually resides at the core of constitutional systems as they
develop, often embodying and expressing what the relevant consti-
tution means, the way in which the EU has developed means it has
impacted upon criminal justice matters as a corollary to economic
enterprise and interests. This is not the way to construct robust
constitutional structures from a criminal justice perspective. It is the
framework within which EU citizenship has thus far been forged,
however.
This paper argues that a failure to re-conceive EU citizenship
appropriately endangers vital, fundamental rights of individual citi-
zens. As Britain attempts to reassert the inter-governmental nature of
EU criminal justice mechanisms,3 the fate of individuals unluckily
caught by and subject to injustice will also fuel Euroscepticism and
could undermine the legitimacy of the EU as a whole. As citizens rely
on their EU rights to facilitate fundamentals such as where they chose
to live, EU institutions strive to provide criminal justice and indeed to
secure broader constitutional rights for all EU citizens, it is high time
to overhaul the concept of EU citizenship to be truly worthy of the
name.
2 For example, the principles of proportionality (see Article 5 Consolidated Ver-
sion of the Treaty of the European Union [2008] OJ C115/13 [TEU]) and non-
discrimination (Article 9 TEU).
3 See HM Government, Security, Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice: A Future
Partnership Paper (18 September 2017) available at: https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/645416/Secur
ity__law_enforcement_and_criminal_justice_-_a_future_partnership_paper.PDF.
The UK Government’s Brexit security position ignores the need for anything but
repressive criminal justice powers.
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II THE CONCEPT AND MEANING OF CITIZENSHIP
Before any analysis of EU citizenship can take place, an under-
standing of the concept is required. Adopting any view of EU citi-
zenship as atypical requires a clear notion of what citizenship usually
entails. This is far from straightforward and no clear definition of
citizenship exists. What citizenship entails and expectations associ-
ated with it, will furthermore vary from member state to member
state across the Union. In order to provide a benchmark of the sort
this article requires for the scrutiny of EU citizenship, key political
science literature is explored.
The conception of citizenship is far from unitary. Definitions
range from the more passive, liberal-individualist to the civic-re-
publican conception of active, lived citizenship.4 It is important to
note that citizenship is fundamentally recognised as a formal status
associated with nation states. As such, it is also a concept that can
exclude5: citizens belong, non-citizens do not.6 The core idea is that
by virtue of membership of a polity, individuals as citizens have the
ability to work to change to nature of that polity. Debates on the
origin of ideas of citizenship abound, but it is clear that the concept
crystallised in a certain form in ancient Greece, where it was associ-
ated with freedom for those fortunate enough to hold this status. It
delineated a non-kinship-based relationship between individual and
city and marked the citizen7 as free, rather than enslaved. Citizens
fought alongside each other to maintain their citizenship and freedom
in this sense. Their political institutions were organised to secure this
freedom, including through compliance with the rule of law.8
In the modern era, citizenship is a child of the Enlightenment,
associated with the emancipatory movements culminating in the
4 In relation to the non-citizen, see David Taylor, Bryan Turner, Peter Hamilton
(eds.) Citizenship: Critical Concepts (Routledge, 1994); J.G.A. Pocock, ‘‘The Ideal of
Citizenship Since Classical Times’’ in Roland Beiner (ed.), Theorizing Citizenship
(Albany, NJ: State University of New York Press, 1995) p. 29; Michael Ignatieff,
‘‘The Myth of Citizenship’’ in Beiner, Theorizing Citizenship, p. 54.
5 In a modern invocation of arguments made by Locke and Kant (in relation to
women and servants), Miller argues it must exclude to preserve the useful features of
national identity, David Miller, On Nationality (OUP, 1997).
6 See Taylor et al., supra note 5, pp. 36–37.
7 Citizens were defined as male, adult and descended from locally-born parents.
8 Geoffrey A. Hosking, Epochs of European Civilisation: Antiquity to Renaissance,
Lecture 3. Ancient Greece, The Modern Scholar (Recorded Books, 2005).
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French and US American revolutions.9 Those contexts saw individ-
uals who had been previously ruled become citizens, endowed with
rights. This was demonstrated by the mass of legislation following
these momentous events. The emergence of citizenship was not,
however, necessarily dependent upon singular, declaratory events,
and countries across Europe saw enlightened’ rulers adopt key ideas
such as codification, citizens’ rights and the rule of law.10 Constitu-
tions across Europe were formed and changed. Citizenship may be
more concrete in jurisdictions in which it is associated with specific
declarations (such as France)11 but it has naturally changed and
developed over time. In jurisdictions such as England and Wales,
where citizenship was introduced in a less dramatic way, ideas of
citizenship determine everyday life.
As a status, however, citizenship is even more difficult to formally
separate from that of nationality in such places.12 A key difference,
however, is precisely that between a national and a citizen, lying in
the citizen’s right to elect those to whom power is given and indeed to
stand for election herself. The core of citizenship is therefore a right
to participate actively.13 Guillaume analyses varied approaches to
citizenship as having an active component in common. He points to
Isin’s analysis that the vital feature of citizenship is its potential to
alter the status and rituals that it entails.14 A citizen is an individual
who can be active and who cannot be constrained from that activity
except in very extreme circumstances (subject to the rule of law). The
fundamental notion of citizenship is of each individual as bearing a
constitutional status as a rights-holder, owed protections by every
9 Rogers M. Smith, ‘‘Modern Citizenship’’, in Engin Isin and Bryan S. Turner
(eds.), Handbook of Citizenship Studies (Sage, 2002).
10 See for example the General State Laws for the Prussian States 1792 (Allge-
meines Gesetzbuch für die Preußischen Staaten, AGB, 1792).
11 See The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 1789 (Déclaration
des Droits de l’homme et du Citoyen 1789).
12 See UK Government, ‘‘Types of British Nationality’’ (2019) at https://www.
gov.uk/types-of-british-nationality.
13 Stefan Kadelbach, ‘‘Part V Citizenship Rights in Europe’’ in Dirk Ehlers (ed.),
European Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (De Grueyter, 2007) pp. 547-548. On the
notion of activity, note Plato’s insistence that citizens must vote and be subject to
punishment for failing to do so. Derek Heater, A Brief History of Citizenship (Ed-
inburgh University Press, 2004) p. 1.
14 Xavier Guillaume, ‘‘Regimes of Citizenship’’, in Engin Isin and Peter Nyers
(eds.), Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies (Routledge, 2014) p. 153.
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governance level. A citizen is a person with the right to have rights.15
A number of responsibilities attach to this status, however.16 A citi-
zen active within a polity is expected to adhere to its values. It is this
form of polity that it has been argued the EU lacks.17
Citizens populate civil society, a third sphere of collective life’18
that Anantram et al. refer to as
an area of associative freedom; the freedom of individuals to enter into rela-
tions with others and pursue common purposes. The reference here is not to
freedom per se, but the active exercise of freedom in forming networks of social
relations… the basic idea behind ‘‘civil society’’ is maximization of associative
freedom and minimization of coercion – by the state, political society, or the
dominant class.19
Citizenship rights provide citizens with the ability to live their lives as
they please and is therefore also to be associated with rights that go
beyond human rights frameworks. In other words, citizens are more
than mere rights-holders entitled to protect areas of their lives from
governmental interference, but rather beings subject to the law and
governing structures, ultimately with collective control over those
very things. They can not only claim protection against the exercise of
power but together alter how power is exercised altogether. For their
status to remain coherent, logically this means that each individual’s
right to have rights must permeate every situation in which (gov-
erning) power is exercised.
15 Isin and Nyers, supra note 14, pp. 18, 36 and 38, referencing Arendt (1966).
16 In Ancient Athens, as in some modern jurisdictions, citizens were obliged to
participate in the democratic processes to elect those populating governing struc-
tures.
17 See Armin von Bogdandy, Gubernative Rechtsetzung. Eine Neubestimmung des
Regierungssystems und der Rechtsetzung unter dem Grundgesetz in gemeineuropäischer
Perspektive (A New Definition of Law-Making and the Governmental System under the
Basic Law (Grundgesetz) in a Common European Legal System) (Mohr, 2000) p. 391.
Dora Kostakopoulou, The Evolution of European Union Citizenship, European
Political Science, 7, 2008, p. 287.
18 Neera Chandhoke, ‘‘The Limits of Global Society’’, in Anheier Helmut, Marlies
Glasius and Mary Kaldor (eds.), Global Civil Society 2001 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2001) p. 36.
19 Kadambari Anantram, Christopher Chase-Dunn, and Ellen Reece, ‘‘Global
Civil Society and the World Social Forum’’ in Bryan S. Turner and Robert J. Holton
(eds.), The Routledge International Handbook of Globalization Studies (Routledge,
2015) p. 557.
MARIANNE L. WADE
Freedom from undue coercion by the state is therefore a key
element of citizenship. Within the continuum of modern political
theory and its translation into reality, the figure of the citizen rep-
resents each individual member of the (presumably powerless) masses
asserting their right to stay the hand of an omnipotent executive in
order to protect the core values of their lives. For the effective limi-
tation of executive power, security from arbitrary punitive action is
key.20 Thus movements advancing citizenship – such as the French
Revolution – were followed by codification procedures ensuring the
ambit of the criminal law was clear and that criminal procedures were
subject to lawful bounds.21 Shaping the boundaries of criminal justice
was urgently and intimately tied to the emergence of citizenship. As
the ability to claim the status of citizenship status has become more
important, so has the ability of individuals to insist upon freedom
from state coercion. Citizenship is accompanied by an expectation of
rights, of freedom and of transparency and accountability in the
exercise of power. The increasing ability of each individual citizen to
assert themselves can thus, for example, be traced through the limi-
tation and then the prohibition of torture to extract confessions
during the criminal process.22 A citizen endowed with dignity may
not be treated in such a manner by their sovereign, nor by repre-
sentatives of that sovereign in the form of (for example) agents of law
enforcement, even when suspected of having committed a heinous
20 Note that the reform of the criminal law and procedure was the subject of the
‘‘greatest activity’’ of the constituent and legislative assembly that followed the
French Revolution of 1789. H.S. Sandford, The Different Systems: Penal Codes in
Europe (Washington: Beverly Tucker Senate Printer, 1854) p. 9.
21 See for example the Introduction to H.S. Sandford, supra note 20, but also the
Expert Group on the Codification of Criminal Law, Codifying the Criminal Law
(Dublin: Government Publications, 2004) para. 1.19 et seq. Note also the Expert
Group’s assertion at p. 5 that one of the ‘‘principle virtues of codification’’ includes
‘‘confirmation of the principle that, subject to the Constitution, the power to alter the
parameters of the criminal law either by creating new offences or expanding the reach
of existing ones rests exclusively with the legislature.’’
22 See e.g. regulation of torture under Charles V: Georg Beyer, Ordnung des
peinlichen Gerichts von Kayser Carolo den V. …: mit einem Reg. aller darinnen
enthaltenen Articul und Georg Beyers Vorbericht von denen Ursachen dieser neuen
Aufflage (Leipzig: Braun, 1724). Detailed description of what torture was allowed in
cases of how much evidence, as part of the Austrian Code in force until 1814 –
Freiburg Torture Museum, photo on file with author.
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crime.23 The modern notion of citizenship has fundamentally chan-
ged the relationship between the executive and individual citizens.
Whilst the concept of citizenship may elude clear definition, it is
sufficiently concrete to enable practices to be deemed incompatible
with modern ideas of citizenship. A further, vital feature is that this is
not a theoretical concept, but rather one that relates to and shapes the
experiences and expectations of individuals. As Tonkiss argues, in
order to be meaningful, citizenship must also be felt in the local.24
For the purposes of this paper, this means it must be noticeable in
every decision that affects the legal position of an individual. It must
certainly be in play (and effectively so) when coercive, punitive
powers are exercised against citizens. As we shall see, this is not true
of EU citizenship as currently constituted.
Modern citizenship should, thus, shape the forms and expectations
of criminal justice decisively. The latter constitutes a particularly
sensitive policy area giving expression to the delicate relationship
between sovereign and the citizen. Criminal law and in particular the
protections of criminal procedure (bearing out constitutional values
e.g. via the need for warrants) are specific and core expressions of
what it means to be a citizen. The criminal law may be characterised
as the strongest expression of civic responsibility and the protections
of criminal procedure an expression of the enduring nature of citi-
zenship (sufficiently durable to shape processes even when they are
responding to a breach of responsibility). This is, however, a con-
troversial balance, often in a state of constant reform.25 The precise
balance of accountability a citizen owes to their community, and how
far they can defend themselves against state power enforcing collec-
tive norms, is thus subject to continual modification.
Nevertheless, criminal justice consistently encompasses the area of
law by which sovereign executives can intervene in the lives of their
citizens most intimately. As Simester, Spencer, Sullivan and Virgo
state, criminal law is the means by which the State forces citizens into
23 See for example the concept of human dignity codified in Article 1 of the
German Constitution (Grundgesetz) at https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/
chancellor/basic-law-470510.
24 Katherine E. Tonkiss ‘‘Experiences of EU citizenship at the sub-national level’’
in Isin and Nyers, supra note 14.
25 Nigel Morris, ‘‘More than 3600 new offences under Labour’’ (4 September
2008) The Independent at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/more-
than-3600-new-offences-under-labour-918053.html.
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complying with its injunctions.’26 Criminal justice measures provide
states with means by which they can deprive individuals of their
property, their liberty, their citizenship rights (and indeed citizenship
itself in extreme and controversial cases).27 The criminal law (so the
cliché goes) delineates the most intimate values of a community.
Those who break the criminal law are stigmatised as having breached
those values;28 they have let down the polity in which they live. They
are required, under the strongest force of law, to make amends in
order to enjoy their citizenship fully again. The punishments of
criminal law place limits on citizenship in various forms.29 Tradi-
tionally, however, modern criminal law involves punishment within a
community. The most extreme form (incarceration) contains an ele-
ment of removal from the community (the central point, after all, is
incapacitation. Additional measures, such as the removal of citizen-
ship rights such as that to vote, further underline the removal from a
community) but with rehabilitation and reintegration usually in-
tended (supported by visitation rights, open prisons, facilitation of
employment upon release, etc.).30 Even the most severe punishment
of citizens will not entirely strip away the core features of their lives
(prisoners will, for example, be located as close as possible to children
to facilitate visits. Convicts are no longer banished to another con-
tinent). The fundamental nature of modern, liberal criminal justice
systems is that executive power is strongly regulated and (so the
theory suggests) stringently limited by law.31 Viewed through the lens
of citizenship, criminal justice provisions lend specific contours to the
balance of the relationship between ruler and ruled.
26 A.P. Simester, J.R. Spencer, G.R. Sullivan, G.J. Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s
Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (Oxford: Hart Publishing 5th edn., 2013) p. 6.
27 See European Parliamentary Research Service, The Return of Foreign Fighters
to European Soil: Ex-post Evaluation (2018) p. 82 et seq.
28 See e.g. C-145/09 Land Baden-Württemberg v Panagiotis Tsakourisdis [2010]
ECR I-11979; also discussed in Elspeth Guild, ‘‘European Union citizenship rights
and duties: civil, political, and social’’ in Isin and Nyers, supra note 14, p. 422.
29 Incarceration, the loss of rights to vote, stand for election, etc. For a European
overview see Milena Tripkovic, Punishment and Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2019).
30 See e.g. Sally Kyd, Tracey Elliott and Mark A. Walters, Clarkson and Keating
Criminal Law: Text and Materials (Sweet and Maxwell, 9th edn., 2017)p. 5; and set
out as the purpose of incarceration in Article 2 of the German Prison Act
(Strafvollzugsgesetz, StVollzG) at: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stvollzg/__2.
html.
31 See Sandford, supra note 20; and Expert Group on Codification, supra note 21.
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III CITIZENSHIP AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
If citizenship is tied, via the concept of civil society, to an idea of
associative freedom, then the European Union is of clear relevance to
any discussion of it. As a supra-national governance level providing
for the free movement of people, goods, capital and services at the
heart of its activities, it clearly advances the capacities of individuals
affected by the freedoms it grants.32 It is not difficult to imagine EU
freedoms forming the basis of many individuals’ notions of civil
society and thus the very basis upon which they live their lives.
3.1 EU citizenship
Since the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU Treaties also expressly pro-
vide for citizenship rights, creating European Union citizenship.
Citizenship of the EU has always been an oddity, legislated for after
negotiations within the Council of the EU.33 This is unusual because
the members of the Council are exclusively members of the executives
of their respective member states. They may be interpreted as acting
in the tradition of enlightened European rulers but (uniquely) neither
the Council nor EU citizenship was created in response to an over-
whelming social force with corresponding scrutiny. This is notewor-
thy because it means the concept of EU citizenship was created by the
very level of government against which citizenship usually acts as a
counterweight. The deficient way in which EU citizenship was created
marks it to this day and renders it unable to fully perform the
functions it must, as defined by this paper.
EU citizenship relates to freedoms that are doubtlessly important
to those who exercise them. However, it is entirely contingent,
existing solely as a result of nationality of a member state.34 It lends
meaningful expression to the special status of the liberties it relates to
(those associated with the four freedoms), but it is, fundamentally, a
different kind of citizenship, born of the circumstances of its partic-
ular ‘‘community.’’ The key oddity for the purposes of this paper is
32 See Catherine Bernard, The Substantive Law of the European Union: The Four
Freedoms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 6th edn., 2019).
33 The European Council and the Council of the European Union consist entirely
of ministers from member state governments, in other words members of diverse
national executives. See European Union, ‘‘European Council’’ at https://europa.eu/
european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/european-council_en.
34 European Union, ‘‘EU Citizenship’’ at https://europa.eu/european-union/
about-eu/eu-citizenship_en.
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that EU citizenship was not created or defined with criminal justice in
mind. Until the Treaty of Lisbon (which came into force some sixteen
years later), criminal justice was simply not viewed as a proper EU
matter. From its legislative starting point,35 the Area of Freedom
Security and Justice (AFSJ) was a ‘‘special area’’ of law reserved for
executive action due to the inter-governmental nature of the former
Third Pillar.36 Whilst structures and organs of the EU were utilised to
criminal justice ends, these were very deliberately characterised as
serving the member states whose executives happened to be choosing
this forum. Criminal justice purposes were expressly catered for as
different, with legislative measures based upon mutual recognition
rather than more traditional EU approaches (harmonisation).37 This
was done precisely to demarcate criminal justice matters as reserved
for the exercise of sovereignty by the member states.38
As it was not a ‘‘proper’’ EU matter, criminal justice was not
deemed to require consideration when EU citizenship was discussed.
Generally speaking, member states have resisted the overt constitu-
tionalisation of the EU in a manner that has allowed criminal justice
to take up its usual, central place (as measured by the domestic set-
ups within the EU).39 Consequently, the idea of EU citizenship
35 Interestingly perhaps, also the Maastricht Treaty, Treaty on European Union
(Maastricht Treaty) [1992] OJ C 191, at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:xy0026&from=EN.
36 On the pre-Lisbon structure of the EU see Steve Peers, EU Justice and Home
Affairs Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd edn., 2011) p. 5 et seq.
37 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions: Tampere European Council 15th
and 16th October 1999, at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.
htm?textMode=on. This came as a British initiative i.e. noticeably at the behest of a
member state most vehemently opposed to the citizenship notion at the EU level and
one in which citizenship rights are not expressed as strongly as in others, due to the
lack of a written constitution.
38 See Jack Straw’s evidence to House of Lords Select Committee on the European
Union, UK Parliament, Prospects for the Tampere Special European Council
(HMSO, 27 July 1999) European Communities Select Committee, Nineteenth Re-
port, para. 19, at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldselect/ldeucom/
101/10104.htm.
39 See e.g. the failed Constitutional Convention and the fate of the Treaty of Nice,
later adapted, stripped of many constitutional features into the Treaty of Lisbon.
Kaarlo Tuori, ‘‘The Failure of the EU’s Constitutional Project’’ (2007) 3 No Foun-
dation: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Law and Justice, 37–48; Willem Maas, ‘‘The
Origins, Evolution and Political Objectives of EU Citizenship’’ German Law Jour-
nal, 15/05, p. 797–820.
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developed without the central relationship to criminal justice matters
usually found in national settings.
Challenges arise, however, because life is not divisible into clean
categories. As Kostakpopoulou observes, citizenship restricted to the
mercantile is a very strange reflection of what a citizen is.40 EU cit-
izenship endows rights fundamental to the way many people choose
to live. Any attempt to restrict EU citizenship to particular areas of
human activity ignores modern understandings of behaviour, such as
the criminological truth that ‘‘crime is normal.’’41 Where there are
people, there will be crime. Citizens across Europe expect a state
response to crime (producing criminal justice), which thus needs to
move in the same realms as people and cannot be artificially con-
tained. Unsurprisingly, criminal justice matters have arisen at the EU
level as a corollary of the freedom of movement of persons42 and
other core policy areas.43 The member states also utilise the forum of
the EU to criminal justice ends.44 Therefore, the AFSJ (i.e. criminal
justice matters within the EU) has become more significant.
The key point in relation to EU citizenship, however, is that it has
evolved marked by the original fiction that it bore no relation to
criminal justice. Consequently, the application of the constitutional
principles (of both member states and the EU) on former Third Pillar
matters is insufficient. The constitutionalisation of the EU has oc-
curred in line with the freedoms it was providing, formed by a(n
executive-dominated) legislature committed to the EU as a gover-
nance level without criminal justice powers criminal justice (as de-
fined by the Council). Whilst criminal justice usually rests at the core
of, and gives meaning to, constitutional systems as they develop, the
development of the EU has impacted upon such matters as a corol-
lary to economic enterprise and interests, or as a result of ad hoc
40 Dora Kostakopoulou, ‘‘European Union Citizenship Rights and Duties’’ in Isin
and Nyers, supra note 14, p. 428.
41 Emilie Durkheim, ‘‘Rules for the Distinction of the Normal from the Patho-
logical’’ in S. Luke (ed.) The Rules of Sociological Method (London: Palgrave, 1982).
42 See C-123/08 Dominic Wolzenburg [2009] ECR I-09621; C-66/08 Szymon Ko-
zowski [2008] ECR I-06041, also discussed below.
43 See Environmental Law Case, C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v
Repubblica Italiana [2006] ECR I-05177; and Ship-Source Pollution, C-440/05
Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union [2007]
ECR I-09097.
44 Hence the inter-governmental nature of the Third Pillar. See Andre Klip,
European Criminal Law (Intersentia, 1st edn., 2009).
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(executive) political will. Attention was thus not paid to their con-
stitutional significance. This is not a viable way to create a robust
framework for citizenship from a criminal justice perspective.
Without such holistic robustness, EU citizenship is rendered far
more malleable than any modern notion of citizenship in the member
states would suggest. Citizens’ expectations are, however, principally
based upon national norms and thus there are significant conse-
quences when the truth of EU citizenship is exposed, as can be seen in
the horrified exasperation of British citizens living in other member
states45 upon discovering that such rights can be withdrawn via a
simple Act of Parliament (after a guiding democratic vote from which
they were excluded).46 This also demonstrates that member state
executives perceive EU citizenship as something they can grant and
take away at will47. If one compares this to the ideas of citizenship
outlined in section 2, one must conclude that EU citizenship lacks
key features usually associated with the concept. In relation to
criminal justice matters, the ‘‘Justice in Europe’’ campaign of Fair
Trials International (and the way in which case examples have been
integrated into Eurosceptic arguments)48 highlights that EU criminal
45 This also led to litigation e.g. in Dutch courts, see Netherlands Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and others v Stichting Brexpats – Hear Our Voice and others (De Staat
der Nederlanden: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken and De Gemeente Amsterdam v
Stichting Brexpats – Hear our Voice and others) [2018] NJ 2018/460 https://uit
spraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2018:2009; and,
‘‘Dutch Judges refer British Expats case to top European Court’’ (17 February 2018)
Deutsche Welle, https://www.dw.com/en/dutch-judges-refer-british-expats-eur
opean-citizenship-case-to-top-eu-court/a-42491751.
46 See UK Government, ‘‘Types of Election, Referendums, and who can vote’’
https://www.gov.uk/elections-in-the-uk/referendums for voting rules. From a legal
point of view it is interesting that this group of British citizens were excluded from
the vote, presumably on the grounds that they did not reside in the UK, while EU
nationals that had exercised their EU right to move to the UK were excluded on the
basis of nationality.
47 Amply illustrated for example by the need for reciprocal agreements to ensure
other member state nationals living in the UK are to be allowed to remain post
Brexit. See Ros Taylor ‘‘Logically Flawed, Morally Indefensible’’ (16 February 2017)
LSE Blog, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/02/16/logically-flawed-mor
allyindefensible-eu-citizens-in-the-uk-are-bargaining-chips/
48 See Fair Trials, ‘‘Justice in Europe’’ at https://www.fairtrials.org/campaign/
justice-europe and e.g. Nigel Farage, ‘‘Why Did Nick Clegg keep Ducking the Vital
Questions in Our Debate Last Night?’’ (27 March 2014) The Independent, https://
www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/nigel-farage-why-did-nick-clegg-keep-
ducking-the-vital-questions-in-our-debate-last-night-9218519.html.
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justice mechanisms can be utilised in manners deeply at odds with any
public notion of justice.
In other words, for those creating them, EU rights may be re-
garded as an add-on, whereas for citizens (i.e. rights-holders), EU
rights may form the foundation of how citizens live their lives and
form associations. Where an EU citizen lives, how they politically
engage, etc. can be entirely dependent upon the freedom of movement
granted by the EU. EU rights thus provide individuals with options
to fundamentally order the framework of their citizenship. For
example, an Irish national can live in Germany and immediately
exercise her right to vote in EU elections there. The longer she lives in
Germany, the better she will likely become established in the com-
munity. Utilising her EU rights, she may reside for long enough to
become entitled to German citizenship and therewith to become fully
active within that polity. EU citizenship bears the potential to widen
and indeed entirely alter individual horizons. It enables a citizen to
wholly redefine their community and civil society. A citizen’s sense of
the local may be entirely dependent upon rights gained via what the
member states have labelled EU citizenship. Further, that label
matters; citizenship is not about a top-down perspective and what
may seem acceptable from that point of view. As highlighted above,
it must be felt in the local and by the individual to truly have
meaning. Tension between member state development and EU rights
doubtlessly mark (and hugely complicate) the development of EU
citizenship. The multi-level governance structures of the EU mean
citizenship of it must evolve in a novel way. They also, however,
urgently necessitate a robust form as the status quo all too often
highlights.
Clearly, EU citizens have clear expectations of the rights and
freedoms granted to them by that status. Unsurprisingly therefore,
the EU, as a governance level espousing the idea of citizenship, has
been called upon to fulfil the promise of that concept. Those called
upon to review scenarios in which EU citizenship rights appear
threatened have demonstrated their own understanding of EU citi-
zenship, decisively marked by more conventional understandings of
citizenship. As the next sections will demonstrate, significant efforts
have been made to interpret the relevant law to render it meaningful,
but again such efforts have been hampered by fundamental defi-
ciencies in the nature of EU citizenship.
Because the idea of EU citizenship raises legitimate expectations
on the part of citizens and because the EU intervenes in core areas of
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citizens’ lives, it is imperative that all parties are working with the
same understanding of what citizenship denotes. To exclude policy
areas marked by citizenship rights in member states is to open those
up as policy-laundering opportunities i.e. using the EU (as a gover-
nance level) to undermine protections owed to citizens within nation
states. Whilst one must recognise that member state governments are
sometimes tempted to act in such a manner, it unquestionably bears
acute danger for the EU. If the EU facilitates hard-won liberties
being undermined, it provides fuel for demands that the EU be dis-
mantled.
3.2 EU citizenship and the CJEU
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the forum in
which arguments highlighting the tension caused in EU citizenship
matters by the divergence between citizens’ expectations and reality
most readily arise. From a citizenship perspective, seminal cases like
the Factortame litigation49 look like conventional demands of citi-
zens staying the hands of sovereigns to secure their rights (in that
case, freedom of movement). The judiciary are called upon, for
example to prevent executives from removing non-nationals from
their territory.50
As Kostakpopoulou notes, challenges put before the CJEU ulti-
mately resulted from the unsustainable nature of EU citizenship as
purely mercantile.51 The idea of EU citizenship advanced in the
Treaties seemingly assumed that individuals are able to separate their
professional and personal beings.52 This was citizenship shaped by
the political reality of what the member states (as represented in the
Council) would accept.53 Unsurprisingly, however, as EU citizenship
49 C-213/89 R (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [1990] ECR I-
02433; C-221/89 [1991] ECR I-03905; C-46/93[1996] ECR I-01029.
50 Thus, Factortame not only asserted the supremacy of EU law but also stayed
the hand of the British executive to secure the EU freedoms of EU citizens. See
Catherine Baksi, ‘‘Landmarks in the Law: The 90s Fishing Case that Stoked UK
Euroscepticism’’ (29 March 2019) The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/law/
2019/mar/29/landmarks-in-law-the-90s-fishing-case-that-stoked-uk-euroscepticism.
51 Kostakopoulou, supra, note 18, p. 286; Willem Maas, ‘‘European Union Citi-
zenship in Retrospect and Prospect’’ in Isin and Nyers, supra note 14, p. 428.
52 As Kostakopoulou also highlights, EU bodies never proposed EU citizenship in
this manner. Dora Kostakopoulou, ‘‘European Union Citizenship Rights and Du-
ties’’ in Isin and Nyers, supra note 14.
53 See also Maas, supra note 52, p. 415.
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rights affected more lives, laws drafted with this in mind came to be
questioned and also came before the CJEU. Through its interpreta-
tion and application of the law, the stature of EU citizenship grew.
The ambit of the CJEU’s consideration of EU citizenship was pre-
determined by the specific form envisaged by the member states. The
CJEU spoke to citizenship issues where an application of EU law was
at stake. As legal complications became more apparent, however, the
designation of only certain areas as relevant for consideration could
not hold up in the real world. The high-water mark of Ruiz Zam-
brano saw the Court establish that any measures that have the effect
of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the
substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of
the Union’ will be regarded as falling within the ambit of EU law.54
EU citizenship became established as independent of economic sta-
tus,’ the tie to economic activity only having proved unsustainable.
Decades of jurisprudence led to the establishment of a more holistic
legal status, recognised by (non-criminal justice) commentators as
true citizenship’.55
This line of CJEU jurisprudence provided an open and interesting
concept of EU citizenship as an independent notion, which could
then become the foundation of a more complete institution and which
might plausibly protect rights, also within the AFSJ context. For
example, there is now ample evidence that citizens being subject to
court decisions in a country other than that in which they reside will
almost certainly be detained, as they are deemed to pose a higher
flight risk.56 This will normally be the case when citizens are ar-
raigned for trial following surrender via the European Arrest War-
rant (EAW).57 In other words, the special measures available for use
against EU citizens in the criminal justice arena expose them to a
higher probability of pre-trial detention. In terms of the enjoyment of
citizenship rights, the detrimental effects of detention are clearly all
54 C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de L’emploi [2011] ECR I-01177; C-
135/08 Janko Rottman v Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-01449; and C-434/09 Shirley
McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] ECR I-03375.
55 See Dimitry Kochenov, and Sir Richard Plender, ‘‘EU Citizenship: From
Incipient Form to an Incipient Substance?’’ (2012) 37 E. L. Rev., 369–396, 393.
56 Fair Trials International, A Measure of Last Resort? The Practice of Pre-trial
Detention Decision-Making in the EU (May 2016) p.7. https://www.fairtrials.org/
publication/measure-last-resort.
57 The key instrument of the AFSJ was created by Council Framework Decision
2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender
Procedures between Member States OJ L 190, pp. 1–20.
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the more devastating if an individual is subject to detention far away
from their families.58 Detention without ordinary visitation possi-
bilities (known to be of great import to detainees and their prospects)
could consequently be construed as interfering with the full enjoy-
ment of freedom of movement. The CJEU might have been expected
to engage with criminal justice matters following the logic of its Ruiz
Zambrano case-law. There was legal potential for the CJEU to bring
the AFSJ into citizenship jurisprudence via a broad interpretation of
what a full enjoyment of rights could mean. Criminal justice scholars
might hesitate to endorse this path, but it had legal potential.
The Court has demonstrated its ability to champion citizens’ rights
in a variety of contexts. The assertive stance taken by the Court in the
Schrems case demonstrated that it can act a forum for more holistic
rights protection.59 That case saw the CJEU declare that national
data protection structures may examine and raise concerns about
standard contract clauses (SCCs) used to transfer data to third states
without data protection regimes deemed equivalent to those of the
EU, but only the CJEU can assess such regimes. The Court appeared
eager to follow its own case-law through to prevent loopholes.
Schrems I saw the Safe Harbour framework struck down as a basis
for data exchange with the US, as no satisfactory system of redress
was available and exchange on the basis of SCCs became standard
operating procedure (these impose contractual obligations upon
parties to ensure adequate data protection). Kadi can also be viewed
as a case of the CJEU tempering the executive power of EU legis-
lation.60
The CJEU’s development of EU citizenship culminating in the
Ruiz Zambrano line of jurisprudence has, however, been halted. Any
hopes for comprehensive rights protection in the AFSJ pinned on it
must be abandoned. Member state displeasure with the notion of EU
citizenship being furthered by the CJEU came to a head in the case of
58 Even where implementation of Measure A (the Right to Interpretation and
Translation) of the Stockholm Programme is perfect, this has an enormous impact
upon the individual. See Justicia, ‘‘Procedural Rights: Right to Interpretation and
Translation (Measure A), at http://eujusticia.net/index.php/proceduralrights/cate
gory/right-to-interpretation-and-translation-measure-a/.
59 C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2015]
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.
60 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat
International Foundationv Council of the European Union and Commission of the
European Communities, [2008] ECR I-06351.
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Commission v UK.61. Although the Court never overtly refers to it as
a citizenship case, it undeniably highlights the core problem with EU
citizenship. The court was confronted by a matter clearly impacting
upon citizenship, as it was asked to decide whether the UK had the
right to insist upon a child having the legal right to reside in the
country before receiving child benefit, or whether this would breach
freedom of movement rights of EU nationals. The Commission as-
serted that the UK Government had imposed a condition additional
to those outlined in Regulation No 883/2004 and was thereby dis-
criminating against EU citizens (because the criterion is one that UK
nationals automatically meet) from other member states legitimately
exercising their freedom of movement rights. The Commission
underlined that the purpose of the Regulation providing for the
coordination of social security systems is to encourage freedom of
movement, whilst the UK set-up was designed to discourage it.62 The
Court, however, interpreted the Regulation as allowing member state
discretion in determining the conditions of access to social security
benefits63 for the economically inactive and thereby ruled that a right
to reside requirement fell within the scope of that discretion.64 The
Court furthermore chose to accept the UK’s assertion that powers
were not exercised in a discriminatory manner and made clear65 that
the Commission must demonstrate the discriminatory nature of such
provisions to trigger protective Court intervention. This point is a key
concern from the perspective of citizenship rights. The Court defers
to an executive, accepting a simple statement of non-discrimination.
Furthermore, the reversal of the burden of proof involved in
demanding that the Commission establish facts of discrimination,
rather than the UK (as the holder of such documentation) being
required to demonstrate that no discrimination is taking place, is
anything but a robust defence of citizenship rights. The principle of
non-discrimination is a fundamental of EU law.66 The abandonment
of effective citizenship protection is further highlighted by the Court’s
failure to examine the proportionality of the measure. The propor-
61 C-308/14 European Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:436.
62 Ibid, para. 45.
63 Ibid, para. 67.
64 Ibid, para. 68.
65 Ibid, para. 85.
66 Codified in Article 9 TEU.
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tionality principle has consistently been a core touchstone of CJEU
scrutiny and that the court should shy away from it when such
defining questions are involved is startling.67
This case is viewed as dismantling the advances made in EU cit-
izenship law. Nic Shuibhne68 speaks of secondary law being given
supremacy over primary law to the point of overruling constitutional
fundamentals. In particular, the citizenship of the children concerned
(who should ultimately benefit from the child benefit and child tax
credits at stake) is entirely ignored. The case has been analysed as
eviscerating’ the concept of citizenship69 and was one of a series of
cases limiting EU citizenship for the economically inactive.70 It
counteracted the Ruiz Zambrano line in which development of EU
citizenship was perhaps adhering to more conventional understand-
ing of citizenship and in which CJEU judges used their understanding
of the concept of citizenship to declare that the principles of EU law
applied to all EU citizens. In so doing, they seemingly abandoned the
CJEU interpretation of citizenship upon which criminal justice
scholars might have pinned more conventional expectations (because
the abandoned interpretation provided legal footholds for e.g. pro-
cedural rights) upon within established EU parameters.
It is particularly concerning to note the apparent lack of concern
for non-discrimination in this case. The nature of citizenship is that
states cannot simply disown errant citizens. European constitutions
have undergone considerable change precisely to limit executive
powers that might allow a state to banish or execute its nationals.
Therefore, the threat of deportation applies only to non-nationals.
The Court might even be accused of rushing to empty EU funda-
mental rights of any such constitutional value because they ignore the
central point, which is that they are allowing member states to utilise
a mechanism that can only be mobilised to the detriment of some
(non-national) EU citizens, meaning the issue of discrimination is
raised.
67 See W. Sauter, ‘‘Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act?’’ (2013)
15 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 439–466.
68 N.N. Schuibhne, ‘‘Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape
of Union Citizenship’’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 889–938.
69 C. O’Brian, ‘‘ECJ Sacrifices EU Citizenship in Vain’’ (2017) 1 CMLR 209–243.
70 C-333/13 Elisabeta Dano and Forin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig [2014]
EU:C:2014:341; C-67/14 Jobcenter Berlin Neuköloin v Nazifa Alimanovic and Others
[2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:210; C-299/14 Vestische Arbeit Jobcenter Kreis Reckling-
hausen v Jovanna Garcia-Nieto and Others [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2015:366.
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Thereafter, in the PI71 case, the Court (decided not to follow A.G.
Bot’s Opinion and instead) seemingly ascribed member states the
discretion to decide which crimes breach fundamental values and
pose a security threat, precisely because no proportionality test was
demanded.72 The court’s failure to restrict its evaluation to serious
crimes means any criminal conduct can demonstrate the requisite lack
of integration, providing executives with tools to discriminate be-
tween criminals and to rid themselves of convicts, even where this
may be harmful to their rehabilitation and reintegration.73 Citizens
will reasonably ask how this can be reconciled with principles such as
the requirement of non-discrimination, which they expect the EU to
uphold as a fundamental value. Freedom of movement rights not
associated with any protection of family life (as soon as a member is
convicted) cannot but be devalued in the eyes of their bearers. As
Mitsilegas analyses, the PI judgment elevates (at least) crimes men-
tioned by the member states in the Treaty (article 83) to a status such
that they can weaken citizenship protections.74 This demonstrates the
fragile nature of EU citizenship: citizenship should protect rights
precisely when the instinct for executive overreach is strongest.
Furthermore, the Commission v UK case highlights the core
problem with EU citizenship, exposing the CJEU as far from inde-
pendent of the circumstances in which it operates. Commentators
speak of the CJEU sacrificing the concept of EU citizenship under
pressure from the imminent UK referendum.75 The Court was faced
with political sensitivity and pressure of the greatest kind and it
buckled despite the substantive issue being citizenship. It could be
argued that it was only able to do so because the law of EU citi-
zenship (as shaped by the Council) lacks sufficient strength to support
a court in doing anything else. For citizenship rights to be mean-
ingful, they cannot be vulnerable to pressure from a single national
executive or political event. A judicature must be equipped (by the
71 C-348/09 P.I. v Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid [2012]
ECLI:EU:C:2012:300.
72 This has been criticised as the court turning a protection against deportation
into a means to facilitate it. See Leandro Mancano, ‘‘Criminal Conduct and Lack of
Integration into the Society under EU Citizenship: This Marriage is Not to Be
Performed’’ (2015) 6(1) New Journal of European Criminal Law, 53–77.
73 See also Valsamis Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law after Lisbon (Hart, 2016) pp.
231–232.
74 Mitsilegas, supra note 69, p. 233.
75 See O’Brian, supra note 65.
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law) to hold its ground against an executive, in the name of the cit-
izens endowed with the rights concerned.
Thus, the CJEU (an erstwhile champion of a more holistic notion
of EU citizenship) has shown itself to be hampered by the mercantile
nature of the concept when under pressure. Further, more recent
cases must be viewed as shutting the door on what CJEU jurispru-
dence had indicated as a possible route to citizenship and criminal
justice relating to each other at the EU level in a more conventional
manner. They represent an institution of citizenship marked by the
limits executives76 wish to set: precisely what citizenship should not
be. A citizen must be able to rely on her rights precisely when the
executive wishes to deprive her of them. This has also been high-
lighted as the weakness of citizenship law by cases (like PI) of EU
citizens settled in another member state who have objected to being
deported following a conviction.77 Far from accepting that crime is
normal (and that citizens commit crime), many member states argue
that a non-national EU citizen who commits a crime has demon-
strated their failure to integrate.78 This notion of criminal activity
(the opposite of even petty crime [a]s normal’) propagated by the
Council is in part accepted by the CJEU in criminal justice matters,
undermining the constitutional nature of the EU citizenship rights
being utilised. Reasonable expectations of citizens are thereby not
met, likely causing them to lose faith in the EU.
76 Member states also logged arguments before the Court in these cases (eight were
represented in PI, for example).
77 See C-378/12 Nnamdi Onuekwere v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2014] EU:C:2014:13; and C-348/09 P.I. v Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid
[2012] EU:C:2012:300.
78 See A.G. Bot’s Opinion of 3rd October 2013 for C-378/12, supra note 73, para.
50, followed by Court. See also Mancano, supra note 68, p. 66 et seq. This is also the
much-criticized aspect of A.G. Bot’s opinion in PI delivered on 6th March 2012: see
Georgios Anagnostaras, ‘‘Enhanced Protection of EU Nationals Against Expulsion
and the Concept of Internal Public Security: Comment on the PI Case (Case
Comment)’’ (2012) 37(5) E.L. Rev. 627–639; and Dimitry Kochenov and Benedikt
Pirker, ‘‘Deporting the Citizens within the European Union: A Counter-Intuitive
Trend in Case C-348/09, P.I. v. Overbürgemeisterin der Stadt Remscheid’’ (2013) 19
Columbia Journal of European Law 369–390, 384–386, Mistilegas, supra note 69, p.
229. Note that alongside the Commission, Germany argued against this blanket
assumption, saying that it should only apply when such a breach demonstrated
disregard for values (so arguing for proportionality, which would have limited the
damaging impact that a short-term sanction and/or less serious conviction might
have).
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Judgments such as these ensure that EU citizenship remains def-
erential.79 Citizens are granted freedoms to reside in member states of
their choosing but even a lengthy period of legal residence will not
preclude the host countries’ right to expel such a citizen upon con-
viction.80 So, EU citizenship is only tentative, not providing surety in
associative freedom. It appears to be rather a stratified notion of
rights, to which only the virtuous (as deemed by the relevant national
executives)81 are entitled. This undermines the very core of citizen-
ship, at the heart of which lies the notion that it is not for the exec-
utive to limit the fundamentals of life. A citizen can and must be held
responsible for her actions within a community but her membership
of that community is protected from arbitrary or discriminatory ac-
tion by the executive.82
Ultimately the CJEU can only operate within the bounds estab-
lished in law. It cannot overcome the fact that EU citizenship is a
fundamentally strange creature. Whilst other courts are also criticised
for a tendency to defer to international agreements and executive
pressure, the EU features specific problems.83 It is fundamentally
limited also by the leitmotifs of the Union. This became abundantly
clear in the Melloni84 judgement, which raised significant concerns
that the EU is unable to respond sensitively to the constitutional
79 And this trend continues devaluing EU citizenship and disenchanting citizens.
See Dimitry Kochenov, The Tjebbes Fail, European Papers, Vol. 4, 2019, No
1, European Forum, Insight of 25 April 2019, pp. 319–336.
80 The serious crime restriction is watered down, as the decision as to what con-
stitutes serious crime is left to the host state. See Mancano, supra note 68, pp. 62–65.
81 False convictions do occur and indeed not all perpetrators of criminal acts are
charged, let alone convicted.
82 This problem has also been amply demonstrated in case law with ship-source
pollution (C-440/05, supra note 43), environmental crime (C-173/03, supra note 43)
and C-43/12 European Commission v European Parliament and Council of the Euro-
pean Union [2014] EU:C-2014/298, which allowed the Commission to utilize a non-
criminal justice basis for legislation with criminal justice impact. Criminal law has
been relegated to its functional ability to give effect to EU policy. No special status is
afforded to it (see also Mitsilegas, supra note 69, p. 22 et seq.) The same approach is
to be found in the Kadi jurisprudence, supra note 60, accepting counter-terrorism
measures due to a link to the common market (see Mitsilegas, supra note 69, p. 25 et
seq).
83 See e.g. the Council of Europe context – J. Wadham, ‘‘Is the European Court of
Human Rights buckling under Westminster pressure?’’ (3 February 2016) UK Hu-
man Rights Blog at https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2016/02/03/is-the-european-
court-of-human-rights-buckling-under-westminister-pressure/.
84 C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal [2013] EU:C:2013:107.
MARIANNE L. WADE
position of criminal justice measures and citizens affected by them.85
That case is widely seen as the CJEU asserting the primacy of EU law
over national constitutional law when an area has been comprehen-
sively regulated at the EU level. In this case, Spanish constitutional
law’s ability to require surrender to be conditional upon a retrial
when an in absentia conviction has taken place was limited by the
EAW legislation. Member states are thus not free to provide for
higher constitutional protections where EU regulation has taken
place and is deemed to be comprehensive. The major concern is that
regulation at the EU level tends to orient towards the lowest common
denominator of member states’ protections, often at the lower end of
what the European Convention foresees.86 In other words, Melloni
legitimately gives rise to fears of policy-laundering for as long as
executives dominate EU law. The failure to locate criminal justice
matters at the heart of EU citizenship renders this sensitive policy
area particularly vulnerable. It is unfeasible and, one might argue,
unfair to expect the CJEU to correct a fundamental problem with
citizenship as conceived at the EU level.
3.3 The growing scope of work in service of EU citizens
Whilst CJEU jurisprudence can certainly be seen as infused with
expectations of citizenship on the part of Advocate Generals and
judges (as well as citizens or the Commission prompting the under-
lying litigation), identifying EU work in the service of its citizens has
become easier in recent years. Even within the jealously-guarded
AFSJ, the EU citizen has become significant. The Framework
Decision against Racism and Xenophobia87 is a notable example of
legislation benefiting all EU citizens, as does victims’ rights legisla-
85 See Vanessa Franssen, ‘‘Melloni as a Wake-up Call – Setting Limits to Higher
National Standards of Fundamental Rights’ Protection’’ (10 March 2014) European
Law Blog at https://europeanlawblog.eu/2014/03/10/melloni-as-a-wake-up-call-set
ting-limits-to-higher-national-standards-of-fundamental-rights-protection/.
86 Mitsilegas, supra note 69, p. 28.
87 Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on com-
bating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal
law OJ L 328. This legislation was also criticised as taking EU activity beyond the
bounds of what is legitimate. See Jeni Iontcheva Turner, ‘‘The Expressive Dimension
of EU Criminal Law’’ (2012) 60(2) The American Journal of Comparative Law, 555–
583.
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tion.88 The underlying idea that EU criminal justice mechanisms
operate in service of the EU citizen has recently been directly stated
by the legislation creating the EPPO.89 The 2018 suggestion to ex-
pand this office’s powers to cover terrorism is also expressed as
such.90 Though not well-conceived, and perhaps not always welcome,
the EU citizen features in the minds of law-makers. For example,
Article 86 TFEU speaks of EU action being allowed to combat
serious crime where the cooperation of member states is necessary i.e.
where doing so serves EU citizens better as a group.
These examples all seek to assist good’ citizens: those worthy of
protection in the minds of executive representatives legislating for
them. However, citizenship rights are not just for the virtuous’.
Furthermore, there is more to the EU than the Council alone. The
increased role of the European Parliament in (even AFSJ) legislative
procedures post-Lisbon is an expression of the elevated status of
citizenship rights.91 This is the channel via which voting citizens can
change their community. The Treaties feature the European citizen
meaning both the Parliament and the Commission (as Guardian of
the Treaties) must serve this figure. Recent years have seen a flurry of
activity by the Parliament (and its LIBE92 committee in particular)
and the Commission in so-called rule of law’ conflicts that serve EU
citizens even when this means conflict with the elected governments of
member states.
88 Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001on the standing
of victims in criminal proceedings OJ L 82. Note also C-105/03 Maria Pupino [2005]
ECR I-05285, which ensured member states could not merely sign up to such leg-
islation without implementing it. The CJEU famously endowed this legislative form
with ‘‘indirect effect’’ and made sure EU citizens could rely upon EU legislation
benefiting their rights, even if a member state dragged its feet. See Stefan Lor-
enzmeier, ‘‘Der Rahmenbeschluss als Handlungsform der Europäischen Union und
seine Rechtswirkungen’’ (2006) 12 ZIS 576–582.
89 See Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing en-
hanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office
(‘‘the EPPO’’) OJ L 283, Preamble 59 and 60. Note that this measure is one of
enhanced cooperation, encompassing 22 member states. Its operational framework
will be relevant to all who cooperate with it.
90 European Commission Press Release, ‘‘State of the Union 2018: A reinforced
European Public Prosecutor’s Office to fight cross-border terrorism’’ (12 September
2018) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_5682.
91 See Maas, supra note 52.
92 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs centrally concerned
with citizenship rights qua its remit.
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Rule of law compliance activities are based upon article 7 TEU93
empowering EU organs to protect the values enshrined in article 2
TEU.94 On a constitutional level, rule of law conflicts are an assertion
that EU citizens are entitled to the rule of law, independent judicia-
ries,95 non-corrupt politicians and so forth. Unlike the highly tech-
nical debates the CJEU has often been drawn into, these require
holistic understandings of citizenship, which also affects criminal
justice mechanisms. They are also an expression of the understanding
those populating EU organs have of citizenship and the values of the
EU. This can be seen, for example, in the Injunction of 19th October
2018 issued by the Vice-President of the CJEU96 prompted by the
European Commission, ordering the Polish Government to cease and
desist in its reform of the judiciary for fear of irreparable damage to
the rule of law until the case can be heard by the CJEU. Whilst it was
mostly phrased in terms of EU interests, it also contained this
statement:
the Vice-President recalls that the requirement of judicial independence forms
part of the essence of the fundamental right to a fair trial, a right which is of
cardinal importance as a guarantee that all the rights which individuals derive
from EU law will be protected and that the values common to the Member
States set out in Article 2 TEU, in particular the value of the rule of law, will be
safeguarded. The infringement of a fundamental right such as the right to an
independent court or tribunal is thus capable, because of the very nature of the
infringed right, of giving rise in itself to serious and irreparable damage.97
93 This reads: ‘‘1. On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by
the European Parliament or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a
majority of four fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the European
Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member
State of the values referred to in Article 2. ’’
94 ‘‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member
States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, soli-
darity and equality between women and men prevail. ’’
95 See the conflict with Poland, in particular Commission Recommendation 2018/
103 of 20 December 2017regarding the rule of law in Poland complementary to
Commission Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374 (EU) 2017/146 and (EU) 2017/
1520; and the Commission’s Letter of Formal Notice to Poland, European Com-
mission Press Release, ‘‘Rule of Law: Commission Launches Infringement Procedure
to Protect the Independence of the Polish Supreme Court’’ (2 July 2018) https://ec.
europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4341.
96 C-619/18 R European Commission v Republic of Poland [2018] EU:C:2018:1021.
97 Supra note, 92, p. 2.
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The damage referred to is feared for individual citizens relying on the
judiciary to protect their rights against the Executive undertaking the
reforms of the judiciary. The CJEU, as requested by the Commission,
is thus lending concrete shape to the institutional provision the
Treaties regard as necessary for all EU citizens. The on-going conflict
with the Fidesz party in Hungary is, perhaps, more strongly marked
as an immigration conflict. Nevertheless, the Parliament report of
12th July 2018 (which called upon the Council to pursue Hungary
under Art 7 for serious breaches’ of the values on with the EU is
founded) declared,
whereas any clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values
enshrined in Article 2 TEU does not concern solely the individual Member
State where the risk materialises but has an impact on the other Member
States, on mutual trust between them and on the very nature of the Union and
its citizens’ fundamental rights under Union law.98
The individual rights protection of all citizens is therewith declared a
fundamental concern of EU organs.
Such concern is apparent also in recent Parliamentary activities
relating to both Malta and the Slovak Republic. These appear to
indicate that EU citizens are entitled to certain protections and that
the Union’s organs will step in where national structures fail. Thus, in
Malta the assassination of an investigative journalist in October 2017
led to a Parliamentary Resolution calling for an independent inter-
national investigation.99 It noted serious concerns regarding the rule
of law, democracy and fundamental rights. Continued monitoring
mechanisms100 and findings of inadequacy clearly represent inter-
vention on citizens’ behalf. Similarly, when European Parliamentar-
ians called for Europol agents to investigate the organised crime-
98 Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on a Proposal calling on the
Council to determine, pursuant to article 7(1) of the Treaty of the European Union,
the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values upon which
the Union is founded, 2017/2131(INL) Preamble B. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
doceo/document/A-8-2018-0250_EN.html.
99 European Parliament Resolution 2017/2935(RSP) of 15 November 2017 on the
rule of law in Malta.
100 A LIBE Committee mission reported on in January 2018 and pressure exerted
upon the Maltese government (e.g. in September 2018) see European Parliament,
‘‘Mission Report: Following the Ad-hoc Delegation to Slovakia and Malta 17–20




related murder of two journalists in the Slovak Republic, this added
to the pressure on the Prime Minister to step down.101 A LIBE del-
egation visit in April 2018 led to an EU Parliament Resolution for the
protection of journalists in Europe.102 A joint investigation team was
also established by Europol and the agency reported in October 2018
that Slovak Police carried out arrests in connection with the mur-
ders.103 In June 2018 the LIBE Committee furthermore established a
Rule of Law Monitoring Group (ROLMG).104 EU Parliamentarians
are thus clearly taking up the defence of citizens’ rights and interests
where they recognise more local structures as failing to do so.
Whilst such undertakings are activities serving EU citizens in their
infancy, they are notable in terms of EU organs embracing their
responsibilities to EU citizens, who are entitled to certain protections.
These institutions bring pressure to bear upon democratically elected
governments in order to protect EU citizenship and those that hold it.
Readers sceptical of the impact such action can have may note the
parallels with the huge push at the Federal level in the US, which is
suggested to be the result of federal law enforcement structures
protecting the civil rights of African-Americans to ensure they were
afforded the protection of criminal law in the 1960s.105
Centrally, parliamentary and commission workers and other
holders of EU positions have their own ideas of citizenship. When
EU legislation speaks of citizens, this resonates with whatever
understanding officials charged with implementation have of such
terms. The vocabulary of values and citizenship is weighty. At the
European level, understanding of these concepts seems sufficiently
uniform and clear for EU officials to act in reaction to, or in harmony
with, these ideas, and thus it matters little whether the Council was
101 See Jennifer Rankin, ‘‘Bring in EU Police over journalist’s murder, MEPs urge
Slovakia’’ (13 March 2018) The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2018/mar/13/slovakia-should-hand-over-journalist-murder-inquiry-say-meps.
102 European Parliament Resolution 2018/2628(RSP) of 19 April 2018 on pro-
tection of investigative journalists in Europe: the case of Slovak journalists Ján
Kuciak and Martina Kušnı́rová.
103 Europol, ‘‘Arrests in Slovakia’’ (2 October 2018) Press Release, https://www.
europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/arrests-in-slovakia.
104 See European Parliament resolution 2018/2965(RSP) of 28 March 2019 on the
situation of the rule of law and the fight against corruption in the EU, specifically in
Malta and Slovakia, Preamble A.
105 See US Department of Justice, ‘‘Civil Rights Division Accomplishments 2009–
2012’’ https://www.justice.gov/crt/us-department-justice-civil-rights-division-accom
plishmnts-2009-2012.
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thinking only of economics when formulating such legislation. What
they poured into law were notions of citizenship and values. These
words consequently have legal meaning for both citizens and the
practice of the AFSJ.
Under extreme circumstances, such notions of EU citizens
demarcate CJEU jurisprudence. The famous Kadi case saw the Court
dig deep to articulate thinking of this sort relating to values. It de-
clared that,
Fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law
whose observance the Court ensures. For that purpose, the Court draws
inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States
and from the guidelines supplied by international instruments for the protec-
tion of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to
which they are signatories. In that regard, the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms has special signifi-
cance. Respect for human rights is therefore a condition of the lawfulness of
Community acts, and measures incompatible with respect for human rights are
not acceptable in the Community.106The cultural and legal framework of the
member states and European concepts such as citizenship thus have a role to
play in informing the interpretation of EU law and action. This is because the
Court and other relevant actors recognise the legitimacy of expectations that
all EU action is informed by and in accordance with common values. The
problem remains, however, that until this form of citizenship is endowed with a
proper legal definition and language, it is vulnerable. The activities that the
European Commission is tasked with as guardian of Article 7 TEU and the
manner in which it places EU actors in direct conflict with member states
governments lends further urgency to calls for EU citizenship to be made truly
worthy of the name. The battle of values is key also to ensuring the continued
survival of the functional balance of tasks between EU and member states as
they currently operate.107
106 US Department of Justice, supra note 101, para 5.
107 This battle is far from merely theoretical in relation to rights protection, for
example. Within the network between EU and national courts there is a delicate
balance expressed by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht in the solange judgement
(Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getriede und
Futtermittel [1970] 11/70 (‘‘Solange I’’); Re Wünsche Handelsgessellschaft [1986]
EVerfGE 73, 339 (‘‘Solange II’’)). How the German Court would view the equiva-
lency of EU rights protection as assumable in the face of confirmed Article 7
breaches is a much more difficult and explosive question.
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3.4 The EU and criminal justice
The fundamental problem from a criminal justice perspective is that
citizenship within the EU opens one up to super-charged repressive
measures without the protections national criminal justice mecha-
nisms contain. From a citizenship perspective, the key function of
effective constraint of state power is not being fulfilled. European
citizens benefit from repressive EU criminal justice measures, how-
ever, in that citizens who can become victims of crime are doubtlessly
served by functional criminal justice systems with the capacities that
enable law enforcement to match the freedom of movement provided
to people, goods, capital and services by EU governance. Member
state governments (and the EU) doubtlessly serve citizens via the
mechanisms and institutions found at the EU level. The Schengen
rules,108 for example, certainly make sense in ensuring freedom of
movement is matched by law enforcement capacities. As in other
areas, the innovations offered by the EU in the criminal justice arena
enhance the lives of citizens.
Criminal justice mechanisms at the EU level overwhelmingly in-
crease and enhance executive action.109 The centre-piece (the
EAW)110 is now flanked by the European Investigation Order
(EIO)111 and specific legislation approximating definitions of crime,
making cross-border investigations simpler.112 Importantly, however,
108 See Thomas Wahl and Sarah Schultz, ‘‘The Enlargement of the Schengen
Area’’ (2007) 3–4/2007 Eucrim 66–67; Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak
Republic, ‘‘Schengen Police Cooperation’’ at https://www.minv.sk/?Schenegn_po
lice_cooperation.
109 See e.g. Lorena Bachmeier, ‘‘Fundamental Rights and Effectiveness in the
European AFSJ: The Continuous and Never Easy Challenge of Striking the Right
Balance’’ (2018) 1 Eucrim 56–63.
110 A first, revolutionary move trumping national constitutional protections such
as the double criminality requirement and particularly extradition prohibitions to
ensure offenders taking advantage of freedom of movement rights could not avoid
efficacious arrest warrants. See Joanna Dawson, Sally Lipscombe and Samantha
Godec, ‘‘The European Arrest Warrant’’ (2017) House of Commons Library, Briefing
Paper 07016; Massimo Fichera, ‘‘The European Arrest Warrant and the Sovereign
State: A Marriage of Convenience?’’ (2009) 15(1) European Law Journal 70–97.
111 Inés Armada, ‘‘The European Investigation Order and the Lack of European
Standards for Gathering Evidence: Is a Fundamental Rights-Based Refusal the
Solution?’’ (2015) 6(1) New J. of EU Criminal Law 8–31.
112 For example, Directive 2011/36/EU of 5 April 2011 on combating and pre-
venting trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council
Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA OJ L 101/1; and, Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the
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the criminal justice advances at the EU level relate not only to legal
mechanisms but also to powerful institutional developments.113
Support is provided to investigators via Europol114 and Eurojust115
as demonstrated by, for example, Theresa May (mid-Brexit negoti-
ations) standing before the press the day after the 2017 Manchester
bombing and repeating the views of the Europol Director as to the
UK’s threat position.116 These institutions provide cooperation hubs,
operate as powerful intelligence centres (particularly in the case of
Eurojust) in which requested measures can be chased up and joint
decisions made. All this takes place without specific or specialised
legal oversight being foreseen117 and with limited accountability
capacity.118
The analysis and intelligence capacities provided institutionally
are matched by databases accessible to law enforcement agents across
the Union. The European Criminal Record Information System
(ECRIS) is a key recent innovation, but systems like Pruem, Schen-
Footnote 112 continued
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism
and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council
Decision 2005/671/JHA OJ L 88.
113 See Kai Ambos, European Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press, 2018) p.
560–616.
114 See Alexandra De Moor and Gert Vermeulen, ‘‘The Europol Council Deci-
sion: Transforming Europol into an Agency of the European
Union’’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1089–1121
115 Michiel Luchtman and John Vervaele, ‘‘European Agencies for Criminal
Justice and Shared Enforcement (Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor’s
Office)’’ (2014) 10 Utrecht L. Rev. 132–150.
116 BBC News, ‘‘Manchester attack: Theresa May Terror Threat Speech in Full’’
(23 May 2017) athttps://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40023457.
117 Because decisions are treated as matters internal to these institutions and re-
main opaque for the defence (so even e.g. Article 41 of the Charter cannot be
triggered). See Luchtman and Vervaele, supra note 110, 138.
118 Compare Europol’s governing structure to that of national police bodies/in-
telligence services. See Sonja Puntscher Riekmann, ‘‘Security, Freedom and
Accountability: Europol and Frontex’’, in Elspeth Guild and Florian Geyer (eds.),
Security versus Justice? (Routledge: Taylor and Francis, 2008). Note also that the
much vaunted difference between Europol and national police services – namely the
fact that Europol possesses no operational powers – fails to acknowledge what
proportion of police work consists of data analysis for serious crime, as opposed to
the utilisation of operational powers. See Marianne L. Wade, ‘‘General Principles of
Transnationalised Criminal Justice?’’ (2013) 9(4) Utrecht Law Review 165–83.
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gen II, and Eurodac are also immensely valuable.119 Harder to
determine in character are provisions made within the Council such
as the Joint Intelligence Centre,120 the Counter-terrorism Coordina-
tor121 and the Anti-Trafficking Coordinator.122 Mechanisms such as
Joint Investigation Teams (JITs)123 are legally complex to define as
European since they are run in accordance with the law of the
member state agreed by the cooperating agencies. A contractual
template, set-up support and funding are, however, available from
Europol and Eurojust, surely rendering the legal designation as
purely national infrastructure misleading.124Agents of both those
agencies can be seconded, thus becoming operational criminal justice
practitioners.
At the time of writing, the next revolutionary step is being
undertaken in the shape of appointment proceedings for the
EPPO.125 This genuinely supra-national criminal justice agency is
being created to protect the financial interests of the EU126 but also
has powers to investigate, prosecute and bring to justice’ ancillary
offences.127 As noted above, the model function of this agency can
119 For an introduction, see André Klip, European Criminal Law: An Integrative
Approach (Intersentia, 2016) p. 482 et seq.
120 Now known as the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre, previously SitCen. See
EEAS Fact Sheet, ‘‘EUINTCEN Intelligence Analysis Centre’’ (05 February 2015)
at http://statewatch.org/news/2016/may/eu-intcen-factsheet.pdf.
121 European Council, ‘‘Counter-Terrorism Coordinator’’ at https://www.con
silium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/counter-terrorism-coordinator/
122 European Commission, ‘‘EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator’’ at https://ec.
europa.eu/anti-trafficking/eu-anti-trafficking-coordinator_en.
123 Europol, ‘‘Joint Investigation Teams – JITS’’ at https://www.europol.europa.
eu/activities-services/joint-investigation-teams.
124 See Tom Schalken and Maarten Pronk, ‘‘On Joint Investigation Teams,
Europol and Supervision of Their Joint Actions’’ in Hans-Jörg Albrecht and André
Klip (eds.) Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice in Europe (Brill, 2013) pp. 423–
437; and M. Plachta, ‘‘Joint Investigation Teams’’ 13 European Journal of Crime,
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 284–302; Bart de Buck, ‘‘Joint Investigation
Teams: The Participation of Europol Officials’’ (2007) 8(2) ERA Forum 253–264.




126 Defined in accordance with Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s
financial interests by means of criminal law, OJ L 198.
127 Article 22(3) of Regulation 2017/1939, supra note 85; see also Preamble 56.
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already be traced with an expansion of EPPO powers to terrorism
proposed in 2018.128
From a criminal justice perspective, it is impossible to formally
distinguish the EU citizen from the member state citizen. The mem-
ber states clearly did not set out with the EU citizen in mind when
invoking criminal justice mechanisms at the EU level. The adoption
of early criminal justice measures via the Third Pillar of the EU
(deliberately segregated to remain inter-governmental in nature) in-
tended these mechanisms to enhance the cooperation of national
criminal justice systems only. This was EU law as a mutation of
mutual legal cooperation: improved, but not fundamentally different.
The density and importance of what these mechanisms have become,
however, now justifies discussion of them as a system of sorts and
thus also of the EU as a level of criminal justice governance. Cor-
128 Few policy areas have impacted more strongly upon citizenship matters than
counter-terrorism with national governments driving to undermine the absolute
nature of the ban on torture. See Christopher Michaelsen, ‘‘The Renaissance of Non-
Refoulement? The Othman (Abu Qatada) Decision of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights’’ (2012) 61(3) ICLJ 750-65), schemes depriving citizens of their status
(see e.g. the Begum and Letts cases e.g. Steve Hewitt, ‘‘Why the UK Could Regret
Angering Canada by Stripping IS Suspect Jack Letts of British Citizenship’’ (20
August 2019) The Conversation at http://theconversation.com/why-the-uk-could-re
gret-angering-canada-by-stripping-is-suspect-jack-letts-of-british-citizenship-122081
), exceptional measures like control orders (see Adrian Hunt, ‘‘From Control Orders
to TPIMs: Variations on a Number of Themes in British Legal Responses to Ter
rorism Crime’’ (2012) 62(3) Crime, Law and Social Change 289–321), EU necessitated
constitutional change (see Damjan Korosec, ‘‘Anti-Terrorism Related Law Reforms
and Human Rights in Slovenia’’, in Marianne L. Wade and Amir Maljević (eds.), A
War on Terror? The European Stance on a New Threat, Changing Laws and Human
Rights Implications (Springer 2009) pp. 245–259; Davor Derenčinović, ‘‘The Evolu
tion of the Antiterror Legal and Institutional Framework in Croatia’’, in Marianne
L. Wade and Amir Maljević (eds.) A War on Terror? The European Stance on a New
Threat, Changing Laws and Human Rights Implications (Springer 2009) pp. 305–320
and for broader analysis, see Cian C. Murphy Transnational counter-terrorism law:
law, power and legitimacy in the ‘‘wars on terror’’, Transnational Legal The
ory (2015), 6:1, pp. 31–54. The tabling of a truly supra-national criminal justice
agency in the current policy-laundering space is cause for alarm bells to shrill; all the
more so when one considers the structural deficits of the EPPO as established. There
is simply no structure foreseen for the policy direction one would expect for a
prosecution service nor effective political, let alone legal accountability (on this see,
Tommaso Rafaraci, ‘‘Brief Notes on the European Public Prosecutors Office’’ pp.
157–163, Marianne L. Wade, ‘‘The European Public Prosecutor: Controversy Ex
pressed in Structural Form,’’ pp. 165–180 and Martin Böse, ‘‘Judicial Control of the
European Public Prosecutor’s Office,’’ pp. 191–202, all in Tommasso Rafaraci and
Rosanna Belfiore (eds.), EU Criminal Justice (Springer, 2019).
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responding holistic consideration of citizenship matters in relation to
that governance level then becomes an obvious, and gaping, lacuna.
3.4.1 EU criminal justice and the CJEU
The lack of consideration afforded to citizenship rights in EU crim-
inal justice matters has led to specific challenges before the CJEU. In
direct encounters with this policy area, the Court has a mixed track
record, viewing criminal justice mechanisms in their constitutional
setting. Unsurprisingly, it proved impossible to keep these entirely
out of the remit of EU court oversight despite the member states’
(pre-Lisbon) intentions. The AFSJ is marked by challenging ideas
requiring interpretation, not least the presumption of mutual trust
among member states’ systems.129 As one would expect, given the set-
up described above, AFSJ matters did not come before the CJEU
specifically badged as citizenship matters. Nevertheless, as should
have become clear, criminal justice matters clearly have ramifications
for citizenship.
On the one hand, the CJEU (in Aranyosi and Căldăraru, for
example)130 recently provided a clear basis for constitutional argu-
ments to override the mutual trust just described. This is a rejection
of the top-down perspective on rights matters and an insistence that
the circumstances of each individual citizen must be evaluated when
they are subject to criminal justice mechanisms. The Court recognised
the EAW’s fundamental rights impact, referring specifically to basics
of EU constitutionality (article 4 of the Charter, referring to art 3
ECHR).131 On the other hand, the CJEU has not proved immune to
the pressures of politically sensitive issues, such as immigration and
the treatment of criminals. The Wolzenburg case saw the CJEU
accepting member states’ assertions that it takes a considerable
amount of time for a citizen to form attachments to a country of
residence, which has relevance to criminal justice decision-making.
Accordingly, until a citizen has resided uninterrupted in a nation for
five years, the connection to the state of origin was considered weak
and could be over-ridden.132 Given how well-established family life
could become in a far shorter time, this means a long wait before the
citizen can see her choices turned into meaningful citizenship pro-
129 For an overview of the relevant law see Klip, supra note 114, 100 et seq.
130 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Pál Aranyosi and Robert Caldararu
v Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen [2016] EU:C:2016:198.
131 C-404/15, supra note 125.
132 C-123/08, supra note 42.
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tections. The more individualized approach taken previously in Ko-
zlowski133 appeared more compatible with a notion of meaningful
EU citizenship. Wolzenburg seems to embrace a reasserted domi-
nance of national considerations and the idea of national identity.
The Da Silva Jorge134 case may be viewed as the CJEU attempting to
correct this somewhat, insisting upon a uniform European definition
of exceptions to EAW refusals, not those restricted to own nationals
only, but the sense of the Court being overwhelmed by political
reality (and therewith the legal strength of citizens subject to execu-
tive pressure) remains.
The CJEU has demonstrated considerable capacity to protect
fundamental rights and thus ensure citizenship values are opera-
tionalized at the EU level. However, the Court has not integrated
such adjudications into its EU citizenship arguments. The more re-
cent submission to pressure is also reflected in the LM135 case, which
demonstrates the tightrope the Court is still walking in relation to the
AFSJ. The Court acknowledged136 that a reasoned Commission
finding of an article 7(1) breach, combined with factors from a sus-
pect’s personal situation, the nature of the offence and the factual
context underlying an EAW, may provide sufficient evidence to
demonstrate a risk of fundamental rights breaches to that citizen.
However, the Court’s deference to the traditional structures of the
EU shone through, emphasising relevant determinations as funda-
mentally a matter of judgment for the Council. Any suspension of the
EAW results from serious and persistent’ breaches of article 2. Only
where the Council has made such a determination must member state
authorities refuse EAWs from an affected member state.137 It went on
to set out that anything short of a Council determination leaves the
citizen dependent upon the judicial authorities in the surrendering
state determining a specific, individual risk of a fundamental rights
breach.138 In other words, citizenship considerations remain at the
mercy of an executive organ. If it fails to act, individuals are
dependent upon a local court being willing to find a member state of
the Union set to breach fundamental rights (ignoring all political
133 C-66/08, supra note 42.
134 C-42/11 João Pedro Lopes Da Silva Jorge [2012] EU:C:2012:517.
135 C-216/18 PPU LM [2018] EU:C:2018:586.
136 Supra note 130, para. 79.
137 Supra note 130, paras. 70–72.
138 Supra note, 130, para. 73.
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ramifications) in order to afford an individual citizen effective pro-
tection. As we have seen, this is a step the CJEU itself has hesitated to
take.
This interplay with Council decisions furthermore demonstrates
the importance of the rule of law proceedings described above. The
concern over backtracking as regards judicial independence in
Romania,139 whilst not phrased in the language of citizenship rights,
triggered EU organs to take steps to protect themselves (via the
suspension of access to funding), which has ramifications for the
EAW following this reasoning. Transferred into the AFSJ such
activity should provide the CJEU with the kind of evidence relevant
in the Aranyosi and Căldăraru140 sense: concrete evidence rebutting
the presumption of mutual trust and thus forming grounds for a
refusal to implement a EAW, for example), and reiterated in LM,
when conflicts with citizens arise. The reference to mutual trust in the
rule of law conflict with Hungary described above also becomes an
important flashpoint, as all mutual recognition instruments are based
upon this. Such a flaw should trigger citizenship protections via
Aranyosi and Căldăraru. The question is what happens to rule of law
conflicts when the impact of any official finding upon the operation of
the AFSJ becomes recognised. Will the CJEU and other Courts
follow through, protecting individual rights even at such a high cost?
To be clear, every EU citizen faces a scenario in which the exec-
utive of her state of residence has opened her up to the assumption
(by any judicial organ to which she might appeal) that the assertions
of another executive should be assumed correct, with minimal
information provided, trusting in both the system of the requesting
state and the good faith of the individual measure (usually an EAW).
LM confirms that, failing a situation in which the majority of the 28
139 See European Commission Press Release, ‘‘Joint Statement of the European
Commission President Juncker and First Vice-President Timmermans on the Latest
Developments in Romania’’ (January 2018) at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_18_423; and the Annual Cooperation and
Verification Mechanism (CMV) Report of November 2018, see European Commis
sion Press Release, ‘‘European Commission’s Progress Report on Romania under
the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism’’ (November 2018) at https://ec.euro
pa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_6365, stating that this will not end
until the rule of law demands of the January 2017 report have been fulfilled.
140 The Court emphasises ‘‘implementation of the mechanism of the European
arrest warrant as such may be suspended only in the event of serious and persistent
breach by one of the Member States of the principles referred to in Article 2 TEU,
and in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 7 TEU’’ (para 81).
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executives have formally agreed that one of their number is in breach
of fundamental values, the burden of proof remains upon an indi-
vidual citizen to prove that the executive of a country in which she
likely does not reside may endanger her fundamental rights. It is
difficult to overstate how far removed this model is from placing
citizenship at the heart of governance. The reliance upon Council
findings related to LM sets a high bar. If EU parliamentary bodies,
the Commission or even the CJEU (in infringement proceedings, for
instance) reach an official finding of article 7 breaches, will a citizen’s
legitimate expectation that these influence decision-making in crimi-
nal processes be ignored if the Council could have acted, but has not?
Can any governance level purporting to act in the interest of its
citizens make a plausible claim for legitimacy in such circumstances?
Fundamental rights protection is clearly an important part of any
citizenship package. Different strands of CJEU jurisprudence can be
traced without necessarily forming a harmonious whole, however,
and criminal justice matters are particularly dislocated. Thus the
Advocate-General’s Opinion in LM strongly invoked the earlier case
of Radu141 in harmony with broader decisions of the Court such as
NS and Others142 and CK and others v Republika Slovenia,143 which
underlined that the fundamental rights of asylum seekers must be
respected in member state decision-making. In these cases, article 4 of
the Charter and the holistic nature of the protection from torture and
inhumane treatment were taken as fundamental and thus shut down
technical arguments as to what has to be considered.144 Effective,
constitutional protection in line with more conventional notions of
citizenship was clearly the Court’s guiding principle here, but its
concern was not explicitly the protection of EU constitutionality or
EU citizenship rights. Further, the Court’s refusal to transfer this
strand of jurisprudence to the AFSJ in LM highlights the vulnera-
bility of that policy area as currently conceived.
More conventional models of citizenship according more closely
with citizens’ expectations would draw more clearly upon the idea of
a relationship between governance level and citizen. CJEU jurispru-
141 C-396/11 Ciprian Vasile Radu [2013] EU:C:2013:39.
142 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. (C-411/10) v Secretary of State for
the Home Department and M.E. and Others (C-493/10) v Refugee Applications
Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2011] ECR I-
13905.
143 C-578/16 PPU C.K. and Others v Republika Slovenija [2017] EU:C:2017:127.
144 Mitsilegas, supra note 69, p. 233.
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dence is often marked by the relationship between suspect and the
relevant member state in criminal justice matters, with any EU role
obscured.145 The criminal justice perspective, however, demands
honest recognition of the role the EU plays in citizens’ lives and
criminal matters, and a corresponding arrangement of citizenship
rights. It is simply too much to demand of local courts (and the
criminal justice practitioners serving them) that they furnish even the
informational demands LM places upon them. Again, this is a sce-
nario which a top-down perspective on citizenship rights might deem
acceptable. However, from the perspective of an individual citizen
with her legitimate expectation of a criminal process, this is far from
the case. This is arguably a scenario in which citizenship is distinctly
not felt in the local and thus is the very opposite of what Tonkiss
identifies as ensuring citizenship is meaningful.
It would be unfair not to recognise the top-down versus individual
citizenship dichotomy presented here as a useful tool but not truly
reflective of EU activity as a whole. In many ways the history of the
AFSJ can be understood as an on-going battle between those member
states (and thus segments of the Council) willing to utilise criminal
justice mechanisms in service of all EU citizens (i.e. including those
accused of criminal behaviour) and those who oppose this.146 Con-
siderable efforts have been undertaken at the EU level in relation to
criminal justice with a more holistic view of citizenship in mind.
Whilst the broader attempt to legislate for defence rights must be
considered defeated, it involved a Framework Decision147 tabled and
pushed by the Commission as well as another attempt by the German
145 As we have seen, however, this can also occur within more central EU policy
areas relating to asylum and indeed freedom of movement of persons.
146 See Maas, supra note 52, p. 412 et seq. The Irish Government when presenting
it and the UK’s opposition to the Framework Decision on Fundamental Rights in
Criminal Proceedings spoke of this legislation as ‘‘precisely the kind of thing the EU
should not be doing’’ at a German Presidency conference in 2006. The UK gov-
ernment’s Brexit Security White Paper very clearly demonstrates a position that
ignores the need for anything but repressive powers and enhancement – see HM
Government, Security, Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice: A Future Partner-
ship Paper, 18 September 2017 available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/up
loads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/645416/Security__law_enforcement_
and_criminal_justice_-_a_future_partnership_paper.PDF.
147 Proposal for a council framework Decision on certain procedural rights in
criminal proceedings throughout the European Union {SEC(2004) 491} /* COM/
2004/0328 final at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%
3A52004PC0328.
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Presidency in 2006.148 This also failed, but not for lack of effort.
Furthermore, the Swedish Presidency revisited the topic in 2009 and
the resulting Stockholm Programme provided for detailed regulation
of a few individual procedural rights.149 Clearly, also within the
Council, varied expectations of what citizenship requires and means
for correct governance are in play. They are, however, not a matter
on which political consensus is achievable. Attempts at this have now
been abandoned. In its latest AFSJ policy declarations the Council
speaks only of consolidation and the implementation of previously
introduced measures.150 Presumably this is a declaration to block
defence rights measures because it has not diminished the capacity of
22 member states to bring the EPPO into being.151 The creation of an
equivalent institution was never foreseen for defence lawyers and
even the creation of support mechanisms for procedural rights ap-
pears blocked for the foreseeable future.152
While one cannot justly declare the EU legislature as entirely
neglecting the broader citizenship dimensions of criminal justice, it
does seem to lack motivation in this regard. The EAW was undeni-
ably well-established before the Stockholm Programme was even
conceived. The investigation order was passed as an approved
mechanism even before the Evidence Warrant legislation was set to
be implemented.153 In comparison, there is simply no denying the
lagging timeline of legislative provision for other measures one might
qualify as liberty-protecting,154 nor their slow implementation in
148 Marianne Wade, ‘‘Deep Rifts on Procedural Guarantees Mirrored at Con-
ference in Berlin’’ (2007) 1-2 Eucrim 31.
149 Cornelia Riehle and Allison Clozel, ‘‘10 Years After the Roadmap: Procedural
Rights in Criminal Proceedings in the EU Today’’ (2019)ERA Forum, https://doi.
org/10.1007/s12027-019-00579-5.
150 European Council Conclusions 26–27th June 2014, Brussels, EUCO 79/14,
para 3.
151 Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing en-
hanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office
(‘‘the EPPO’) OJ L 283.
152 See the resistance to the budgetary implications of measure C of the Stockholm
Programme for instance. Sarah Ludford, The European Arrest Warrant: issues and
solutions (October 2013) Speech given at the ALDE group, European Parliament,
Brussels.
153 Martyna Kusak, ‘‘Mutual Admissibility of Evidence and the European
Investigation Order: Aspirations Lost in Reality’’ (2019) 19(3) ERA Forum 391–400.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12027-018-0537-0.
154 See Klip, supra note 114, p. 438 et seq.
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terms of national law and practice.155 Even when passed, individual
measures that might hugely benefit suspects such as Eurobail156 be-
come greatly delayed and remain largely unused.157 Measures such as
the Framework Decision on the Transfer of Prisoners,158 which
might be viewed as a mechanism to ensure successful rehabilitation159
(by supporting family visiting rights, for example), reveal their true
character via the declaration that the consent of the person affected is
not necessary.160 In other words, the member states envisage this as a
tool for themselves, not incarcerated citizens. Practice has further-
more demonstrated that citizens remain very much at the mercy of
the member states as to whether it will be utilised to ensure prisoners
are returned to the member state of their choice (to be closer to their
family, for example).161
It is important to stress that this is not the result of decisions being
made at the EU level. This is very much the status quo being created
and vigorously defended by member states as part of that collective.
Frequently, of course, such decisions are made within the Council.
Nevertheless, arguments advanced are distinctly national in nature
and backed by arguments pertaining to the principle of subsidiarity
155 See e.g. Riehle and Cloyel, supra note 144, 3.
156 Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA of 23 October 2009 on the
application, between Member States of the EU, of the principle of mutual recogni-
tion to decisions on supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention,
OJ L 294/20.
157 See COM (2014) 57 Final: Report from the Commission to the European
Parliament and Council on the implementation by the Member States of the
Framework Decisions 2008/909/JHA, 2008/947/JHA and 2009/829/JHA on the
mutual recognition of judicial decisions on custodial sentences or measures involving
deprivation of liberty, on probation decisions and alternative sanctions and on
supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention.
158 Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the
application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters
imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the
purpose of their enforcement in the European Union OJ L 327, pp. 27–46.
159 Reiterated as the core aim of criminal sanctions under EU law, reconfirmed by
A.G. Bot in C-145/09 Tsakouridis, supra note 28, AG Opinion delivered 8th June
2010.
160 Preamble recital 5 FD 2008/909/JHA of 27th of November 2008, supra note
153. For extensive analysis see Mitsilegas, supra note 69.
161 See, for example, the refusal of the Netherlands to repatriate its own nationals
because of the large number convicted for drug smuggling offences. The financial
considerations of the Dutch prison service are regarded as more important than the
effective rehabilitation of prisoners.
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and the overriding need to respect the sovereignty of nation states.
The superiority of states – represented as they are by their executives
– comes at the expense of the individual rights of citizens and the
power of other arms of government (legislature and judiciary). The
Council apparently does not appreciate that member states acting
collectively as the Council constitute a distinctly different level of
governance and as such owes distinctive duties and protections to its
citizens collectively (as opposed to a collection of member state citi-
zens).
Whilst arrangements preceding the Treaty of Lisbon perhaps lent
legitimacy to an argument that the EU was simply a forum of mu-
tated transnational criminal law – an area of intense mutual legal
cooperation – the integration of the AFSJ into EU law proper (since
the Treaty came into force) renders that point moot. The EU now
undeniably has significant legislative power in criminal justice mat-
ters. Institutions such as Europol and Eurojust have become agencies
of the Union, funded from its budget. Further, development inten-
sifying the investigative, informational and institutional power of
criminal justice mechanisms at the EU level continues unabated. It is,
therefore, undeniably time for an honest re-evaluation of the rela-
tionship between EU citizens and this governance level as a criminal
justice actor.162
IV THE EUROPEAN UNION CITIZEN: SERVED
AND IGNORED BY THE AFSJ
The EU is an executive-dominated governance level at which mea-
sures are being passed and implemented that massively benefit
executive organs in the exercise of their powers. Even where concern
is raised as to the balance of criminal justice, legislation passed to
support defence rights is far less effective and far from comprehensive
in nature. As the Council becomes less dominant in legislative pro-
162 The practical consequences need not be as dramatic as one might imagine. For
example, citizenship rights would already be considerably advanced by an individual
being empowered to insist upon executive agencies within her member state of res-
idence implementing and stringently applying liberty-enhancing measures as effi-
ciently as it does repressive EU measures. If Eurobail was applied, for example, a
European citizen could insist on the mutual recognition of bail orders so that they
remain at liberty (adhering to reasonable reporting restrictions), within their normal
setting, up to the trial date set by the relevant jurisdiction, rather than the EAW and
surrender pending trial being the ‘‘go-to’’ option as is currently the case. Indeed,
from a fiscal and fundamental rights perspective, this would be desirable.
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ceedings post-Lisbon, this situation may change, but it is important
to note that the Council still requires use of the extraordinary leg-
islative procedure (in which it remains dominant) for the most sen-
sitive provisions in this area. Furthermore, it inserted so-called
emergency break’ provisions to ensure member states cannot be
overrun in this policy area.163 As matters stand, the EU clearly af-
fords member states mechanisms by which the arm of law enforce-
ment can be boosted in a transnational dimension without
corresponding extension of the arm wielding the shield of criminal
justice. The AFSJ is profoundly marked by resistance to the notion of
proper EU citizenship. The very concept of modern citizenship,
however, underlines that this is not a matter in which executives can
pick and choose.
Resistance to the encroachment of EU criminal justice matters
into constitutional contexts has not been even-handed. As established
above, repressive instruments (despite appearances of more technical,
everyday criminal justice provision) have not been stopped by their
impact upon constitutional law. The required acceptance of the
EAW, for example, meant that many accession states were required
to enact constitutional change (lifting the ban on extraditing their
nationals particularly) to join the EU in 2004.164 Member state
executives have thus proved far more comfortable with an expansive
notion of EU citizenship in certain contexts. Indeed, the notion of the
EU citizen is a figure of utility in some settings.165 Article 3(2) TEU
states that,
The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice
without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in
conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border con-
trols, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.166
Thus, a common definition of substantive offences such as terrorism
and human trafficking is framed as necessary to protect EU citizens
and their values. Procedural measures such as the EAW are needed to
163 Stephen Coutts, ‘‘The Lisbon Treaty and the Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice as an Area of Legal Integration’’ (2011) 7(7) Croatian Yearbook of European
Law & Policy 87–107, 102.
164 See Derenčinović, supra note 123.
165 See, for example, the citizen being addressed in Council Regulation (EU) 2017/
1939, supra note 146, Preambles 59 and 60.
166 See, for example, Directive (EU) 2017/541, supra note 108, Preambles 3 and 12;
Directive 2011/36/EU, supra note 108, Preambles 1 and 4.
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ensure the four freedoms are not taken advantage of, ultimately
leaving the EU citizen unprotected from those who break the rules of
this emerging polity.167
These needs of EU citizens have been deemed great enough to
traverse considerable boundaries (particularly relating to freedom of
movement). The victim citizen has been endowed with rights in
criminal proceedings at the EU level to ensure procedures work
well.168 In all of these cases, the EU citizen is not overtly addressed as
such, but (at least) since the decision of the Grand Chamber in Pu-
pino169 members of the Council have known they are legislating for
all citizens of the Union. Increasingly, therefore, the Council, in its
expansive use of the AFSJ, must be viewed as serving the EU citizen,
even if in an asymmetric manner. The Council’s Strategy 2019-24
indeed emphasises protecting citizens and freedoms’ as one of the
four highest priorities of the Union.170
The Council has in truth engaged in discussion of the AFSJ’s
relationship to citizenship from the early days. Some member states
have always advanced a more holistic notion of what citizenship
should mean in this policy area. The EAW Framework Decision was
introduced on the understanding that it would be swiftly followed by
legislation securing defence rights in criminal proceedings, precisely
because some member states viewed the introduction of such
repressive power without the counter-balance of freedom-securing
mechanisms as illegitimate. The political consensus to recognize the
enormity of what was done (and therewith the kind of re-character-
isation EU citizenship underwent upon the introduction of the EAW)
simply disappeared when liberty-securing mechanisms were tabled.171
167 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, supra note 57, Preamble 5.
168 See Council Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support
and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/
220/JHA, OJ L315; and C-105/03, supra note 84.
169 C-105/03, supra note 84.
170 COM(2019) 353 Final: Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the European Council and the Council – Nineteenth Progress Report
towards an Effective and Genuine Security Union, p.1.
171 In critical criminology, evaluation of the cynical mobilisation of certain fig-
ures within criminal justice abound, such as the description of victims as ‘‘the
restorative face of new punitivism.’’ Note also that the UK Government has opted
into the new Eurojust arrangement and ECRIS, despite on-going Brexit negotia-
tions.
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This was reflected also in states opting out of Stockholm Programme
measures.172
The problem of the EU as a policy-laundering’ governance level
that strengthens national governments and weakens citizens that
might be in tension with such governments is clear. The usual checks
and balances of national liberal systems have no place within this
framework. This is not exclusively a citizenship problem but certainly
a cause for citizens to feel betrayed and subjected to illegitimate
exercises of power facilitated by the EU. Ultimately this clearly
undermines the legitimacy of the EU. Although the Lisbon Treaty
amended the Treaties to ensure greater Parliamentary participation
(providing the EU Parliament with a legislative role but also making
it, alongside national parliaments,173 a key means of ensuring
accountability) cannot fundamentally change this. The history of
justice and home affairs (JHA) as the Third Pillar ensures the exec-
utive branch has an enormous head start. Its priorities are already
operationalised. Any adaptation of the concept of EU citizenship to
truly acknowledge this has yet even to be tabled; any channel via
which citizens can voice their citizenship expectations, yet to be cre-
ated. Furthermore, parliamentary participation is subject to excep-
tions in relation to criminal justice and the European Parliament is, in
any case, not structured to do this task justice.174
The problem of policy-laundering becomes obvious when, for
example, one regards the various responses to the CJEU’s Digital
Rights Ireland judgment, contrasting member states’ courts with
governmental reactions (the UK forms an exception with the Su-
preme Court, unlike its EU counter-parts, apparently reading the
172 Juan Santos Vara and Elaine Fahey, ‘‘Transatlantic Relations and the Oper-
ation of AFSJ Flexibility’’ in Steven Blockmans (ed.), Differentiated Integration in
the EU – From the Inside Looking Out (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies,
2014) pp. 103–125.
173 See Eurojust, Article 85 (1) Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European
Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2016] OJ
C202/1; and Europol Article 88(2) TFEU.
174 Sergio Carrera, Nicholas Hernanz, and Joanna Parkin, ‘‘The Lisbonisation’ of
the European Parliament: Assessing Progress, Shortcomings and Challenges for
Democratic Accountability in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.’’
(September 2013) CEPS Paper No. 58, at https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/
lisbonisation-european-parliament-assessing-progress-shortcomings-and-challenges/
.
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judgment very narrowly).175 The judicature clearly differs greatly
from the executive in its understanding and application of funda-
mental rights. Furthermore, structural issues abound. Even where
CJEU judgments come down as a robust defence of principle, as in
this case, which clearly highlights the supremacy of privacy and data
protection and strengthens proportionality requirements, more
practical considerations can be decisive. In that case, the Court’s
failure to address whether such blanket retention can ever be lawful
met only a very muted legislative reaction across the Union.176 Some
member states’ non-compliance (or in the UK’s case, apparent con-
tradiction) of the CJEU may be regarded as a power play. Thus, even
where the CJEU upholds a principle, its institutional setting may
mean that is insufficient to ensure the constitutional nature of citi-
zenship is protected.
AFSJ measures are transporting the EU citizen into spaces where
she cannot expect to be treated equally to resident country nationals
(e.g. bail hearings). The equal treatment that forms the core of EU
citizenship for those who have exercised their freedom of movement
rights cannot be applied straightforwardly in the criminal justice
context.177 The notion that this can be deemed collateral damage of
how the EU operates is to deny the constitutional nature of EU
citizenship, and would allow member states to utilise the EU for
further repressive criminal justice ends, whilst ignoring the constitu-
tional nature of that setting (as established in their domestic systems).
The failure to acknowledge the appropriate legal level within which to
place such developments has furthermore prevented any considera-
tion of novelty (as would be warranted within the EU Framework).
The EU is not merely a super-sized replication of the nation state.
The imposition of criminal justice by the EU, or implemented by
other systems on its behalf, may be different in nature to national
175 See Niklas Vainio, Samuli Miettinen, Telecommunications data retention
after Digital Rights Ireland: legislative and judicial reactions in the Member
States, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Volume 23, Issue 3,
Autumn 2015, pp. 290–309.
176 Niklas Vainio, Fundamental rights compliance and the politics of interpreta-
tion, in Tobias Bräutigam and Samuli Miettinen (eds), ‘‘Data Protection, Privacy
and European Regulation in the Digital Age’’ (Helsinki, 2016) ; Helsinki Legal
Studies Research Paper 46, pp. 229–259.
177 Kostakopoulou, supra note 52, 430.
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executive organs so doing, because the EU is a governance level in its
own right.178
The decisive point is that as a result of what has been established
in the AFSJ, the EU is now in a fundamentally different position to
that when EU citizenship was initially conceived. The EU has become
established as a significant criminal justice actor. As a governance
level, it exposes citizens to criminal justice practitioners acting as
Europeans. This is obvious when, for example, a Europol agent be-
comes involved. However, the contradictory fiction is often kept alive
by preventing European agents from being given a direct role and a
nominated national agent or prosecutor (acting upon information
conferred by Europol, a JIT or similar) performing investigative and
prosecutorial tasks. The EU citizen is served by the Europol agent,
but that agent is not manifested as part of the process to ensure the
European citizen can hold her accountable for the contribution she
has made. A national agent acts as an intermediary and the veneer of
a legal fiction. The time has come, however, for the law no longer to
accept this veneer or the labels applied to such scenarios by execu-
tives. For EU citizenship to be felt in the local, it is necessary that that
a local officer benefiting from Europol intelligence) should regard
themselves as a European agent, with a duty of care towards every
European citizen. Ironically, the double-hat principle invoked to
ensure greater national control of the EPPO179 provides a model for
legal accommodation of precisely the kind of accountability argued
for. Currently, EU mechanisms mostly allow practitioners to delegate
responsibility for constitutional protections to a foreign colleague (at
a later time), rendering citizenship considerations something pro-
mised for the future, rather than felt in the actual, current local.
Within member states, the rule of law depends upon executives
being unable to divest themselves of their duty of care or constitu-
tional obligations to citizens via false labelling180 or outsourcing.181
178 For analysis of specific examples to illustrate this see Wade, supra note 118, p.
165 et seq.
179 Deputy European prosecutors – those actually carrying out investigations and
prosecutions – will remain embedded in national systems although paid for by the
EPPO. See Articles 13 and 17 of EPPO Regulation, supra note 146.
180 See ECtHR stance on Article 6, Stefan Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal
Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) p.13 et seq.
181 See e.g. the striking down of a scheme requiring landlords to check nationality/
residency rights of potential tenants with its discriminatory effects - R v SoS for
Home Department [2019] EWHC 452 (Admin).
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Transferring such notions to the EU level in criminal justice terms
means that if punitive powers are transferred to or via the EU level to
impact equally upon all EU citizens, they must also be equally pro-
tected. Particularly after Melloni182 (in which the CJEU affirmed the
primacy of EU law, even over national constitutional law providing
higher protection), we must ensure this is entirely fit for purpose and
demand that the AFSJ serves the EU citizen in her entirety.183 Fur-
thermore, effective constitutional protections doubtlessly require
specialist mechanisms for political184 and legal accountability.185
EAW procedures have demonstrated all too clearly that judges re-
main locked in their national context when it comes to human rights
protection, forced to rely upon a colleague in another member state
(perhaps to a considerable extent in the future) to ensure the citi-
zenship protections usually embedded in national criminal proce-
dures. If constitutional law is to have meaning and the term
citizenship’ particularly, then the fiction that the EU only adds a
layer to pre-existing national structures must be effectively countered.
To declare that the freedoms and mechanisms currently provided
by the EU (also within the AFSJ as it stands) cannot be given or used
is not in the interests of EU citizens. The EU provides freedoms many
citizens cherish and there is much to be said for the more potent
cross-border law enforcement mechanisms of the AFSJ.186 Such
freedoms and powers must, however, be granted and exercised in
honest recognition of their nature. Contexts lending expression to
182 Case C-399/11, supra note 76.
183 The fact that this is limited to areas with a direct nexus to EU law (see CJEU
cases: C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson [2013] EU:C:2013:105; C-42/17
Criminal Proceedings against M.A.S. and M.B. (Taricco) [2017] EU:C:2017:936; C-
206/13 Cruciano Siragusa v Regione Sicilia – Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambi-
entali di Palermo [2014] EU:C:2014:126) is of no comfort as the EU’s remit extends
strongly into areas of serious crime and as the competence of its institutions (Europol
and Eurojust, nevermind the EPPO) extends.
184 On the creation of a potential model (developed for Europol) see Valentin
Kreilinger, A watchdog for Europe’s policemen (2017), Jacques Delors Institute
Berlin, Policy Paper 197, 12th June.
185 The EPPO model currently being made a reality provides considerable cause
for concern in this regard.
186 See National Crime Agency, ‘‘National Strategic Assessment of Serious and
Organised Crime’’ (2019) at https://nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/pub
lications/296-national-strategic-assessment-of-serious-organised-crime-2019/file; and
Europol, ‘‘Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA)’’ at https://
www.europol.europa.eu/socta-report.
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constitutional fundamentals cannot be transmitted to the EU level
without their constitutional setting also being transferred.187 The
insistence of a few member states on attempting this (even whilst
pushing aggressively for criminal justice measures to punitive ends at
the EU level)188 means these contexts strain the meaning of citizen-
ship more broadly, and EU citizenship in particular. The Treaty of
Lisbon undeniably represents enormous legal transformation and
brings with it a constitutionalising effect upon the AFSJ.189 The
problem remains, however, that the citizenship model being advanced
is limited. Fundamental principles are only mentioned in preambles
or superficially attended to and so cannot be operationalised. En-
abling this to happen in the multi-level context of the EU is
unquestionably a challenge of herculean proportions. It is, however,
one to which attention must be turned. By extending the punitive arm
of member states’ criminal justice systems via the EU to serve these
interests of the EU citizen, the member states have introduced the
very heart of traditional citizenship concepts to the EU governance
level. They must now also accept the consequences of so doing.190
Entering such discussions, one should be cautious not to over-
romanticise the nation state-based notion of citizenship. It too is
highly contested when it comes to the protections afforded to (sus-
187 For example, the EAW allowing prosecutors across the Union to trigger arrests
in any member states, without creating a court able to hear complaints against all
aspects of such warrants means only a part of criminal justice mechanisms is facil-
itated via the EU.
188 See for example the UK in the counter-terrorism context analysed in
Marianne L. Wade, Fighting Terrorism – The Unprincipled Approach in Marianne
L. Wade and Amir Maljević, supra note 123.
189 For a precise analysis see Mitsilegas, supra note 69, p. 9.
190 The Schengen development, for instance, stands as the most obvious demon-
stration of the futility of trying to separate mercantile activity from security. The
fundamental flaw of attempting this was exposed as the smaller group of member
states (whose geography perhaps made the matter more pressing) signed the
Schengen Accord outside the framework of the EU (because there was insufficient
political consensus within the EU) in response to developments within it. Never-
theless, it cannot be denied that the focus of EU activity relates to law enforcement.
Notably, no Schengen equivalent has been attempted to secure defence rights pro-
vision, for instance. This one-sided concern at EU level stands in clear contrast to the
constitutional and human rights provision limiting the reach of executive agencies
within national settings.
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pected) criminals.191 Tensions at the EU level do not emerge from
that context. They are there precisely because they are on-going in the
constitutional contexts of member states. This naturally only in-
creases the potential potency of the EU for policy-laundering, with
the ability to undermine constitutions. It is ironic that the one-sided
criminal justice push gathers such momentum just as the Lisbon
Treaty changes directly address the longer-standing criticisms of the
EU as lacking democratic basis and legitimacy. It is existentially
important to the EU to close such damaging lacuna because the
utilisation of this governance level as a policy-laundering arena
encourages those seeking to negate its value. Member states must
finally be forced to recognise that if they continue to utilise the EU as
a means to circumvent their national parliaments and constitutionally
established judicial systems, they endanger the EU itself. If those
things the Union provides citizens with (and which they in turn value
as a basis for their lives) are ultimately insecure or built on an
asymmetric rights basis that does not meet reasonable expecta-
tions,192 this will undermine EU credibility more broadly. That such
arguments are mobilised disingenuously by Eurosceptics and the
press is not new. However, the Commission’s robust rule of law
stance makes high-profile conflict inevitable. Rendering EU citizen-
ship fully worthy of the name is thus not only a matter of existential
importance to a number of citizens but may well be so for the Union
itself.
The EU may not be the creator of problems we encounter in
criminal justice processes engaging its procedures and institutions but
it does massively increase the reach and impact of such difficulties
where its mechanisms are implemented. It cannot be the function of a
governance level created to enhance the lives of its citizens to super-
charge the disparity and unfairness known to characterise national
criminal justice systems. This demands that we confront such prob-
lems honestly as a new sovereign is empowered in this sensitive policy
area. The EU is a huge geographical area with 24 official languages
and 31 legal systems (at the time of writing) and yet no provision has
been made for the exercise of executive power across this domain to
191 See Citizenship deprivation cases discussed supra note 123, furore over pris-
oners’ voting rights surrounding the case of Greens and MT v UK before the Court
of Human Rights (appl. nos 60041/08 and 60054/08 ), etc.
192 On the tension between citizen and member state wishes, see Guild, supra note
28, p. 422 et seq.
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be coupled with proper consideration of its impact upon the citi-
zen.193 This highlights the inadequacy of EU citizenship.
The conventional argument is that the EAW, EIO, etc. are not the
EU as a sovereign imposing punishment and there is some truth to
this. EU mechanisms are carefully constructed to ensure it is a na-
tional criminal justice system carrying out a given activity. The
question is, however, whether it is legally correct to accept this la-
bel.194 There is also truth to the assertion that citizens are only ex-
posed to these mechanisms because they are EU citizens: that
national criminal justice practitioners are only acting as they do be-
cause the EU legislator has empowered that agent to do so. From a
fundamental rights point of view, an EAW is not the same as a
national arrest warrant; a JIT, a Europol-supported investigation, is
not the same as one governed by a clear set of national procedural
laws; a decision being made in Eurojust is not the same as that of a
local prosecutor. In comparison, transparency is much reduced and
the possibilities of effective appeal are not provided for, as those
affected only have recourse to national courts. For a long time, we
have insisted that EU citizens must put up with this empowered
executive without counter-balancing protective and participatory
rights. Particularly now that a genuinely EU criminal justice agency is
being created (the EPPO), this position can surely no longer be al-
lowed to stand.
V CONCLUSION: THE PRESSING URGENCY OF EU CITI-
ZENSHIP FIT FOR PURPOSE
The very idea of citizenship evokes expectations. Individual citizens
expect a facilitative framework within which to live their lives as an
active part of the communities that shape their lives. Such expecta-
tions are decisive not only in relation to the legal objections lodged by
193 Interestingly Commission Impact Assessments look primarily to financial and
more technical impacts, even in the criminal justice realm. See e.g. EPPO impact
assessment. European Parliament, ‘‘Initial Appraisal of a European Commission
Impact Assessment: European Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on
the Establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office – Impact Assessment
(SWD (2013) 275 final, SWD (2013)274 final (summary)) for a Commission Proposal
for a Council Regulation on the Establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s
Office (COM (2013) 534 final)’’ at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
note/join/2013/514087/IPOL-JOIN_NT(2013)514087_EN.pdf.
194 Article 6 ECHR context makes us aware that this is dangerous, supra note 178.
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individuals when they suffer concrete losses due to the deficient
nature of EU citizenship as it currently stands: they also affect the
understanding of those employees of EU institutions who breathe life
into EU law and policy. If they are instructed to serve the EU citizen
(even in an act of legislative window-dressing), this will have meaning
for such individuals who carry the ideas of citizenship from their own
member states. Given the recognised deficiencies of EU citizenship,
such expectations simply prime EU legislation for conflict. Where the
member states then decide to use EU mechanisms for something as
sensitive as criminal justice ends, without ensuring legitimate citi-
zenship expectations are considered, naturally controversial litigation
and argument ensues. The member states have clearly elected to
mobilise the EU as a governance level for policy matters that
necessitate a fleshed-out concept of citizenship to legitimately house
them. It is therefore high time due attention is given to the meaning of
EU citizenship.
As things stand, it appears eminently reasonable to describe EU
citizenship in its current form (particularly when viewed from the
AFSJ perspective) as an odd creature. The citizenship to be found in
technical legal treatment such as CJEU jurisprudence or specific
legislative instruments frequently does not fit with the concept ad-
vanced since the Enlightenment. This is worthy of discussion because
the legitimacy of EU law is not assessed only by specialist lawyers and
the AFSJ draws EU mechanisms into an arena exercising coercive
force against citizens. EU citizens themselves have reasonable
expectations raised by the concept.195 The asymmetrical development
of the AFSJ is problematic because vocabulary matters.
Currently the impression is that EU citizenship is malleable196 and
a matter of technical legal application. Whilst in national settings
criminal law is often an expression of what citizenship is, efforts at the
EU level have often seen such considerations pushed into the back-
ground as executive priorities outweigh everything else within the
legislative procedure. This paper argues that this failure to recognise
that criminal justice is an area of delicate balance is a key failing for
195 In parallel to Cryer’s assertion concerting international criminal justice, see
Robert Cryer, ‘‘Royalism and the King: Article 21 of the Rome Statute and the
Politics of Sources’’ (2009) 12(3) New Criminal Law Review 390–405, 391. Such
expectations are unlikely to be reduced to the kind of technical legal meaning the
CJEU employs in the light of the lacuna discussed above.
196 See, for example, the discussion of transfer of prisoners in Mancano, supra note
68, p. 61 et seq.
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the EU governance level. As the ultima ratio of state power, the status
quo of criminal justice in European nations has been forged over
centuries of history in which the abilities of rulers to punitively
intervene in the lives of their subjects was curtailed by movements
that brought about modern liberal democracies. Criminal justice and
the balance within systems producing it remains a dynamic and
controversial policy area. However, all European criminal justice
systems contain functions analogous to the sword and the shield. The
EU has been criticised for disproportionately advancing the free
movement of the sword independent of the shield. As such, the EU
can be accused of failing to learn lessons from the US experience,
which saw states deliberately utilising Federal law and institutions to
undermine state constitutional protections.197
It would be grossly unfair not to recognise that EU citizenship has
meaning, particularly in areas of law squarely covered by the Trea-
ties; that the constitutionalising process of the Lisbon Treaty is
underway (and significant); and indeed that developments like the
Charter are of great value and may provide important impetus for
change. The same is true of the rule of law interventions the Parlia-
ment and Commission are embroiled in at the time of writing. That
the AFSJ is operationalised in a grossly asymmetrical fashion re-
mains a formidable deficit, however. The lacuna opened up in crim-
inal justice is not addressed by membership of the
European Convention on Human Rights. That mechanism is in-
tended to ensure standards in the national context and is not easily
adapted to something like the EU. The EU Charter, of course,
contains rights of relevance198 and jurisprudence will doubtlessly
render these more robust. Nevertheless, the AFSJ is unquestionably a
context becoming constitutionalized without any idea of a sovereign
punishing citizens at its core. As we have seen, this leaves both it and
EU citizens at the mercy of executives.
Fundamentally, citizenship is not a status that can be granted
within the limits a sovereign deems appropriate. By its nature, the
concept pushes at the boundaries of what an executive finds com-
fortable. A citizen is an active member of a community, endowed
with the right to work to change the remit of her sovereign, to stay
the hand of that power, so that she can live her (civically responsible)
life within the bounds she chooses. By utilising citizenship’, the
member states have adopted the language of revolution and elevated
197 See e.g. Lisa Miller, The Perils of Federalism (OUP, 2008).
198 For an overview see Mitsilegas, supra note 69, p. 9.
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it to the EU governance level. The concept embodies the idea of the
presumed powerless exposing the fallacy of that assumption when
executives mobilise against their core interests. The developing,
democratising EU language used by parliamentarians (who clearly
feel responsible for citizens) reflects this.
With this latest development, the Union as a governance level is
also taking robust steps against democratically elected governments
to ensure the protection of the rule of law and EU values.199 This
invariably brings criticism and scrutiny with it. With that in mind,
unmet expectations and values betrayed in the context of individual
EU mechanisms pose a bigger problem, including for the (legitimacy
of the) EU itself and the significance of how it is perceived by a
broader audience. The EU, whether represented by the Commission
or the Council, cannot insist that the CJEU uphold the Union’s
values and the lofty ideals of article 2 TEU (Rule of Law) in
infringement proceedings against member state governments, without
expecting it to uphold them when individual citizens challenge leg-
islative instruments or member states’ implementation/operationali-
sation of them.
If EU citizenship is not transformed into something closer to the
core concept, it will become new ground for pessimism within citi-
zenship studies.200 If the citizenship provided to member states’ citi-
zens within the boundaries of the EU endows them with the freedom
to travel but simultaneously allows member states to undercut the
constitutional protections their polity has established within criminal
justice structures, citizens will perceive it as negative. If the EU pre-
sents itself as providing the right to move freely but, for example,
does not protect families that result from the exercise of that freedom,
the value of what it offers will be considerably diminished in the eyes
of its citizens. Doubtlessly this is a politically sensitive area. However,
if the TEU speaks of the EU being founded upon the values of
respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of
law and respect for human rights’ and the CJEU intends to ensure
full enjoyment of rights’, then EU citizens will understandably expect
their EU citizenship to protect them. The rule of law demands that
their expectations be attended to.
199 As outlined in the TEU.
200 See Engin F. Isin and Peter Nyers, ‘‘Introduction: Globalizing Citizenship
Studies’’ in Isin and Nyers, supra note 14, p. 5; Teresa Pullan, ‘‘How European
Citizenship Produces a Differential Political Space’’ in Isin and Nyers, supra note 14,
p. 437, utilising Derrida (Spectres of Marx).
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The time of EU citizenship as ‘‘democracy to come’’201 is therefore
surely over? If the criminal justice successes achieved202 are to remain
sustainable, they must be housed in an appropriate constitutional
setting, ensuring the fundamental tenets of criminal justice are ad-
hered to and therewith their legitimacy secured. In short, EU citi-
zenship must deliver the meaning it promises. What precisely it
promises and citizens can legitimately expect must doubtlessly be
clarified via extensive political dialogue including citizens. Such dis-
cussion is long overdue.
This paper highlights the need to also place EU criminal justice
developments at the heart of structured considerations of Union
citizenship and vica versa. It seeks to build a bridge between the
citizenship studies it draws upon, highlighting their value to the EU
criminal justice scholarship it seeks to further thereby undertaking a
first academic step of the kind of discussion EU citizenship requires.
Only such an integrated approach can truly contribute to meeting the
reasonable expectations of citizens; the goal we all pursue. The sword
of criminal justice has been pressed into the hands of the EU. The
agents wielding it may look a bit odd, ungainly and unwieldy, but
from the perspective of citizens, wield the sword they do. Meaningful
citizenship in the European tradition (drawing inspiration from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States’203) demands
an equivalent shield. How precisely this should be formed is doubt-
lessly still a matter for extensive, and controversial, debate. Never-
theless, citizenship demands it.
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